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ABSTRACT
In  this  thesis  I  argue  that  the  psychological  study  of  concepts  and 
categorisation,  and  the  philosophical  study  of  reference  are  deeply 
intertwined.  I  propose  that  semantic  intuitions  are  a  variety  of 
categorisation judgements, determined by concepts, and that because of 
this, concepts determine reference. I defend a dual theory of natural kind 
concepts, according to which natural kind concepts have distinct semantic 
cores  and  non-semantic  identification  procedures.  Drawing  on 
psychological essentialism, I suggest that the cores consist of externalistic 
placeholder essence beliefs. The identification procedures, in turn, consist 
of prototypes, sets of exemplars, or possibly also theory-structured beliefs. 
I argue that the dual theory is motivated both by experimental data and 
theoretical  considerations.  The  thesis  consists  of  three  interrelated 
articles. Article I examines philosophical causal and description theories 
of natural kind term reference, and argues that they involve, or need to 
involve,  certain  psychological  elements.  I  propose  a  unified  theory  of 
natural kind term reference, built on the psychology of concepts. Article II 
presents two semantic adaptations of psychological essentialism, one of 
which is a strict externalistic Kripkean-Putnamian theory, while the other 
is a hybrid account, according to which natural kind terms are ambiguous 
between  internalistic  and  externalistic  senses.  We  present  two 
experiments, the results of which support the strict externalistic theory. 
Article  III  examines  Fodor’s  influential  atomistic  theory  of  concepts, 
according to which no psychological capacities associated with concepts 
constitute them, or are necessary for reference. I argue, contra Fodor, that 
the psychological mechanisms are necessary for reference.
Keywords: Semantic internalism, semantic externalism, causal theory of 
reference,  description  theory  of  reference,  psychological  essentialism, 
prototype  theory,  psychosemantics,  concept  atomism,  informational 
semantics, rigidity, compositionality.
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8A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY AND NOTATION
‘Single quotes’ are used when referring to terms and italics are used when 
referring to kinds, properties, and descriptions. Italics are also used for 
emphasis.  SMALL CAPS are used to refer to concepts. By ‘concept’ I mean a 
mental  representation;  for  instance,  the  concept  CAT is  a  mental 
representation  of  cats.  By  ‘category’  I  mean  the  set  of  objects  that  a 
concept  applies  to;  for  instance,  the  concept  CAT applies  or  refers  to 
whatever belongs in the category of cats.
Part I: Introductory Essay
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1. INTRODUCTION
Concepts  are  mental  representations  of  categories  of  objects,  and they 
enable us to recognise and make inferences about the objects belonging in 
the represented category. For instance, my concept CAT determines which 
creatures I am disposed to count as belonging in the category of cats. If my 
concept of cat consists of representations of features meows,  has whiskers, 
and  preys  mice,  then I  am disposed to categorise as a cat anything that 
meows,  has  whiskers,  and  preys  mice.  Possessing  the  concept  CAT also 
enables me to make inferences about cats: I know that if an object is a cat, 
then it is likely to meow, have whiskers, and prey mice. Concepts make 
the world an intelligible whole to us. They organise the vast complexity of 
individual  objects  and  properties  around  us  into  easily  conceivable 
categories.  For  example,  when looking  out  of  the  window,  I  see  trees, 
grass, the sky, clouds, and people instead of simply a jumble of individual 
objects  and  qualities.  Without  concepts  each  object  I  meet  would  be 
completely novel to me; say, I would have to acquaint myself with each 
and every cat over and over again. I would have to learn of each individual 
cat that it meows, has whiskers, and preys mice, but I wouldn’t be able to 
generalise my knowledge of individual cats to cats in general. In fact, cats 
as  a  category  would  not  even  exist  for  me,  but  rather  I  would  only 
perceive individual objects that don’t have anything in common.
Concepts are often assumed to determine not only which objects we 
reckon  as belonging in categories,  but also which objects  truly belong in 
them. In other words, concepts are often supposed to determine not only 
categorisation,  but  also  reference.  The  two notions  are  not  equivalent: 
people  may be disposed to  categorise  in the extension of  a concept an 
object that the concept does not really refer to,  and people may  fail  to 
categorise in the extension of a concept an object that the concept  does  
refer to. For example, I might categorise a cleverly constructed cat-like 
robot as a (real) cat, even though the creature is not really a cat. Again, I 
might fail to categorise a real cat as a cat, if it happened to be cleverly 
disguised  and  trained  to  look  and  behave  like  a  skunk.  Reference  is  a 
normative relation that concerns what a concept truly applies to, whereas 
categorisation concerns how speakers as a matter of fact happen to use 
concepts.  Accordingly,  reference  is  typically  studied  in  armchair 
philosophy and categorisation in experimental psychology.
These are some discrepancies between categorisation and reference, 
but do the two notions have anything in common? Some theorists have 
argued that  reference and categorisation  are wholly  separate,  and that 
philosophy  and  psychology  examine  concepts  from  wholly  distinct 
perspectives—philosophical study about reference is normative in that it is 
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concerned about the  correct use of concepts, whereas psychology studies 
how concepts are  as a matter of fact used (see Rey 1983; Smith, Medin, & 
Rips 1984; Rey 1985). Yet other theorists take that concepts, conceived in 
the  psychological  sense,  determine  both  reference  and  categorisation 
(Laurence and Margolis 1999). This is the view that I will also defend.
1.1. Concepts determine reference
What a concept truly applies to is not distinct from what we take it to 
apply  to.  Reference  is  not  some  mind-independent  fact,  but  what  a 
concept refers  to  is  determined by our intuitions about how we would 
apply  the term in various  situations,  actual  and  possible.  Consider,  for 
instance,  the  case  against  the  description  theory  of  reference in  the 
philosophy  of  language.  According  to  the  description  theory,  a  term 
applies  to  whatever satisfies  the description,  or  cluster  of  descriptions, 
associated with it in the mind of the speakers. For instance, suppose that a 
speaker associates with the term ‘gold’ a description such as  the yellow,  
shiny,  malleable,  metallic  substance.  This  description arguably manages to 
pick out gold (that is, the element Au) in everyday circumstances, but not 
necessarily: gold could be heated so that it becomes gaseous, and would no 
longer be  yellow, shiny, malleable, nor metallic (Laurence and Margolis’ 
(1999) example). Despite failing to satisfy the description associated with 
the term ‘gold’, the term would arguably still refer to the gas—after all, it is 
Au and is produced by heating gold. This counts as evidence against the 
description theory of reference. How do we know that gaseous Au is gold? 
Philosophers  typically  call  our  knowledge  of  this  fact  intuitive,  but  the 
notion of intuition is of little help here, since there is no agreement on 
what philosophical intuition specifically is (see e.g. the theme number on 
philosophical  knowledge  in  Grazer  Philosophische  Studien,  74,  2007). 
Philosophical  theories  of  intuition  aside,  we  may  make  a  simple 
observation:  intuition about  reference is  categorisation.  In intuiting that,  in 
the  above  scenario,  the  term  ‘gold’  refers  to  gaseous  Au,  I  am  simply 
making a categorisation judgement that gaseous Au is gold. 
Obviously philosophical  intuition  is  different  from typical,  everyday 
categorisation  behaviour;  it  is  more  considered  and  immutable.  To 
compare, upon observing a sample of a gold-like substance with the naked 
eye and categorising it as ‘gold’, there is always the possibility of error—
the sample might be fool’s gold or some other non-Au substance. On the 
other hand, in philosophical thought experimentation we can determine 
all  the  facts  possibly  affecting  our  categorisation  judgement,  which 
enables us to discover the ultimate criteria for category membership. We 
may make presumptions, independent of contingent matters of fact: if this 
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sample  of  a  gold-like  substance  shares  some  deep  structure  with  the 
samples ordinarily called ‘gold’, then it really is gold; if it doesn’t, then it is 
not gold. Philosophising about reference is trying to find out all the facts 
possibly affecting what we take to belong in the extension of a term, and 
systematising  them  into  a  theory  that  specifies  the  necessary  and 
sufficient  conditions  for  the  correct  application  of  a  term.  Building  a 
theory of reference can be compared to experimental study in psychology: 
we formulate hypotheses about what a term refers to (say, that it refers 
via descriptions, or causal chains), and test these hypotheses in the face of 
what we take to belong in the term’s extension in various counterfactual 
scenarios. 
Since  concepts  determine  our  categorisation  judgements,  they  also 
determine our philosophical intuitions about counterfactual cases. If we 
suppose  that  our  intuitions  about  counterfactual  cases  constitute or 
determine reference,  then  we  must  conclude  that  concepts  determine 
reference.  And it  is  reasonable,  if  not  even  inevitable,  to  suppose that 
intuitions do constitute reference; for if they didn’t, they would not serve 
as  evidence for  or  against  theories  of  reference at  all—say,  it  wouldn’t 
matter at all  for the reference of ‘gold’  whether we take gaseous Au to 
belong in the extension of the term ‘gold’ or not. 
Noticing  that  concepts  determine  our  reference-constituting 
intuitions has two important consequences. The first is mostly relevant 
for  the  psychological  study  of  concepts.  That  concepts  determine 
reference  makes  it  intelligible  to  study  concepts  from  the  semantic 
viewpoint.  If a theory of concepts cannot account for reference, then it 
cannot  possibly  be  a  complete  theory  of  concepts.  A  complete  theory 
should both  account  for  reference and also  explain why we have such 
intuitions about philosophical counterfactual cases as we in fact do. The 
second  consequence  is  important  mainly  from  the  perspective  of  the 
philosophical  study  of  reference.  Traditionally  reference  is  studied 
through reflecting on our intuitions about possible cases, and theories of 
reference  are  typically  purely  abstract  models  of  these  intuitions,  not 
taking a stand on what causes these intuitions. That is, philosophical study 
of reference models our intuitions about reference, but does not explain 
what it is about concepts that cause these intuitions.
Consider, for example, the Kripkean causal theory of reference. On this 
account, the reference of a natural kind term is fixed in an initial baptism—
say, the term ‘gold’  is introduced by pointing to some usual samples of 
gold and stipulating that ‘[g]old is the substance instantiated by the items 
over there, or at any rate,  by almost all  of them’ (Kripke 1980, p.  135). 
After  this  baptism,  the  term  refers  solely  to  samples  of  the  kind 
instantiated by the samples pointed at. Supposing that this kind is Au, the 
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term ‘gold’  then  refers  solely  to  instances  of  Au.  This  entails  that,  for 
instance,  gaseous  Au  belongs  in  the  extension  of  ‘gold’,  and  thus  the 
account (unlike the description theory) is concordant with our intuition 
that gaseous Au is gold. But what does Kripke’s account really teach us, or 
what does it explain? The predictions of the causal theory may be in line 
with  our  intuitions  about  reference,  but  the  theory  does  nothing  to 
explain  why we have those intuitions. If concepts are the causes of our 
reference-constituting  intuitions,  then  a  (complete)  theory  of  concepts 
would explain why we have such intuitions about counterfactual cases as 
we in fact do, and would thus explain what makes terms refer like they do. 
Philosophical theories of reference investigate merely the  effects  (that is, 
intuitions)  of  what  in  the  first  place  determines  reference,  whereas 
psychology  of  concepts  investigates  the  causes  of  reference.  (Figure  I 
illustrates  this  position.)  This  raises  doubts  about the sensibility  of  the 
traditional philosophical study of reference. 
Figure I. ‘MR’ stands for mental representation.
I do not wish to claim that the philosophical study of reference would be 
completely illegitimate. It can point towards new aspects about language 
use by pointing out interesting counterfactual cases (consider the case of 
gaseous gold), and philosophical theories of reference may serve as guides 
about why we have certain kind of referential intuitions. For example, the 
causal  theory  suggests  that  at  least  natural  kind  concepts  may have  a 
causal, or externalistic, element in them. However, I take it that building 
an  adequate  theory  of  reference  using  purely  a  priori  methods  cannot 
succeed. Philosophers are deemed to investigate merely the effects (that 
Concept
(MR) Determines
Reference
Intuitions about 
counterfactual cases
Psychology of concepts Philosophy of reference
Studies Studies
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is, intuitions) of the real determinants of reference (that is, concepts), and 
can thus never find out what really determines reference. In order to build 
a  complete  theory  of  reference,  we  must  consult  experimental 
psychology.
My  proposal  could  be  objected  to  as  follows.  I  am  claiming  that 
psychologists  study the causes of  reference,  whereas philosophers  only 
model the effects of the causes of reference; that is, intuitions. But aren’t 
psychological  accounts  of  concepts  based  just  on  intuitions  as  well: 
roughly,  psychologists  present  subjects  with  descriptions  or  images  of 
objects  and  ask  whether  they  belong  in  a  category  or  not.  Aren’t  the 
subjects’ responses to such tasks intuitions as well, comparable to those of 
philosophers?  Just  like  a  philosopher  is  imagining  in  her  mind  a 
hypothetical case and asks herself what a term applies to in that situation, 
isn’t  a  psychologist  doing  just  the  same  thing,  except  for  that  the 
psychologist is using many subjects and an experimental setup? I grant 
that  even  the  psychologists  are  deemed  to  investigate  concepts  only 
through their effects (that is, the subjects’ categorisation judgements), but 
I  deny  that  this  would  make  philosophical  and  psychological  study  of 
concepts equal.  Consider, for instance, the experimental evidence against 
the  definition  theory  of  concepts.  The  definition  theory  holds  that  a 
concept  is  a  definition  specifying  the  singly  necessary  and  jointly 
sufficient  criteria  for  category  membership;  say,  the  concept  BACHELOR 
consists  of  the  definition  unmarried  adult  male.  However,  experimental 
study  has  revealed  that  people  tend  to  judge  various  instances  of  a 
category as more or less typical than others; Casanova is more typical a 
bachelor than a monk, or a car is more typical a vehicle than a tricycle. 
The  judged  typicality  of  a  category  member  explains  a  range  of  other 
categorisation phenomena,  such as  the speed in categorising objects  as 
instances of the category, or the ease of learning or recalling an object or a 
subcategory  of  the  concept.  These  findings  suggest  that  concepts  are 
prototypes instead  of  definitions;  that  is,  probabilistic  sets  of  features 
where  each  feature  has  a  specific  typicality  value.  Specific  prototype 
theories  to  date  have  become  extremely  sophisticated.  It  is  highly 
improbable that a philosopher could ever have ended up in similar models 
purely on basis of armchair reflection. Psychologists’ use of experimental 
methods  gives  them  a  strong  advantage  over  philosophers,  who  are 
utilising  introspection  and  thought  experimentation,  and  makes  them 
much more likely to achieve a correct account of reference.
I  do  not  wish  to  argue  in  detail  here  why  the  psychological,  or 
psychologically  motivated  study  of  reference  is  superior  to  purely 
philosophical—that is a metaphilosophical question that cannot be settled 
in this introductory essay. I propose to endorse a more practical strategy: 
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let’s  not  immerse  ourselves  in  endless  philosophical  debates  about the 
study  of  reference,  but  rather  let’s  start  studying  reference  by 
investigating the psychological accounts of concepts. This is what I intend 
to  do in  this  thesis;  I  will  leave  methodological  and metaphilosophical 
issues to others.
1.2. Ignorance and error problems, and semantic externalism
Investigating  concepts  from  the  semantic  perspective  is  by  no  means 
unproblematic. There is especially one class of problems that weakens the 
ground  for  the  semantic  study  of  concepts;  these  are  the  so-called 
ignorance and error problems, and, more generally, semantic externalism. The 
ignorance  and error  problems and  semantic  externalism are  originally 
formulated in the  highly  influential  writings  of  Saul  Kripke (1980)  and 
Hilary  Putnam  (1975),  and  they  are  raised  against  the  psychological 
theories of concepts by Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis (1999).
The traditional psychological accounts equate concepts with some set 
of  identificatory  knowledge  about the category  members.  For  example, 
the  definition  theory  holds  that  a  concept  consists  of  a  conjunctive 
definition  which  specifies  the  singly  necessary  and  jointly  sufficient 
conditions  for  a  sample’s  being  categorised  as,  or  belonging  in  the 
concept’s  extension  (on this  account,  concepts  are  taken  to  determine 
both categorisation and reference). According to the definition theory, an 
object falls in the extension of the concept if and only if it possesses each 
and  every  of  the  features.  Now,  the  ignorance  problem  is  that  the 
identificatory knowledge represented in a concept may be insufficient to 
delineate  the  true extension  of  the concept.  We already examined one 
problem of this kind, namely the case of gaseous gold. The example was 
raised against the description theory of reference, but it applies equally to 
the definition theory of concepts. Suppose that the concept GOLD consists of 
a  definition  such  as  the  yellow,  shiny,  and  metallic  substance.  Now,  the 
concept arguably refers even to gaseous gold, even though it is neither 
yellow, shiny, nor metallic. On the other hand, the concept does not refer 
to fool’s gold (or some other non-Au gold-like substance) which is indeed 
yellow, shiny, and metallic. The problem of error, on the other hand, is 
that  the  identificatory  information  a  concept  consists  of  may  be 
erroneous. For example, earlier it was believed that gold is a compound, or 
that whales are fish, or that water is an element, but despite these false 
beliefs,  the  terms  still  arguably  referred  to  gold  (Au),  whales  (certain 
mammalian sea animals), and water (H2O), respectively.
The  ignorance  and  error  problems  can  be  considered  merely 
symptoms of a yet more profound problem pertaining to the traditional 
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theories of concepts. There is wide agreement in the philosophical circles 
that some terms (or the corresponding concepts) refer externalistically: the 
reference of these terms is not determined solely by the mental states of 
the  speakers,  but  also  by  some  external  matters  of  fact  (Kripke  1980; 
Putnam  1975).  Externalistically  referring  terms  include  at  least  proper 
names and natural kind terms; in this thesis I will focus solely on natural 
kind terms.  There is  no generally  accepted  definition  for  what  natural 
kind terms specifically are, but typically they are taken to include at least 
terms  referring  to  natural  substances,  kinds,  and  phenomena,  and 
biological species. These terms include, among others, ‘cat’ ‘tiger, ‘gold’, 
‘water’, ‘iron pyrites’, ‘heat’, ‘light’, ‘sound’, and ‘lightning’ (Kripke 1980, p. 
134). I will take it that if natural kind terms refer externalistically, then so 
do their corresponding concepts.
Externalism about natural kind terms can be illustrated with the help 
of  Putnam’s  famous  Twin  Earth  thought  experiment.  Putnam  asks  us  to 
imagine a distant planet, call it ‘Twin Earth’, where almost everything is 
exactly  like  on  Earth.  Twin  Earth  is  inhabited  by  people  who  are 
psychologically  qualitatively  identical  to  us,  and who speak a language 
just like English. There occurs a substance on Twin Earth that is in almost 
all  respects  just  like  our  water:  it  is  odourless,  colourless,  thirst-
quenching,  life-supporting,  fills  seas  and  lakes,  and  so  on.  The  twin 
earthlings  call  this  substance ‘water’.  However,  there  is  one important 
difference between Earth and Twin Earth: whereas the substance called 
‘water’  on  Earth  is  H2O,  the  respective  substance  on  Twin  Earth  is  an 
altogether different, complex chemical substance, XYZ. Finally, place both 
Earth and Twin Earth in the year 1750 when the chemical composition of 
the substance called ‘water’ was not known on either planet. Now Putnam 
asks: did twin earthlings and earthlings refer to the same substance with 
their term ‘water’? Putnam’s answer, widely accepted in the philosophical 
community,  is  negative:  despite  being  identical  in  their  mental  states 
(narrowly construed), earthlings referred with their term ‘water’ solely to 
H2O, whereas twin earthlings referred solely to XYZ. So we must conclude 
that the reference of at least natural kind terms (and their corresponding 
concepts) is not determined solely by the speakers’ mental states (again, 
narrowly construed).
Externalism  might  seem  to  present  a  problem  for  the  traditional 
psychological study of concepts: if the mental states of speakers cannot 
(alone) determine the reference of some of their terms, then neither can 
concepts if they are conceived of as mental representations (see Braisby et 
al. 1996, p. 249). I take it that the problem is merely apparent, and that if 
externalism about natural kind terms is true, it is so because  we make it  
true—it is we ourselves that pass over the responsibility of reference fixing 
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to some external matters of fact. Consider the Twin Earth case again. How 
do we know that in 1750 our term ‘water’ did not in fact refer to XYZ? 
Answer: we simply intuit.  This, however, is of little help, since the core 
question remains unanswered: why do we intuit in this way? After all, we 
could have had the intuition that (in 1750) XYZ did indeed belong in the 
extension of our term ‘water’ (some philosophers have defended such a 
position; see Segal 2000; Crane 1991). What causes our intuition that Twin 
Earth’s  XYZ was  or  was  not  water  in  1750 is  our  concept  WATER.  If  the 
concept causes us to categorise the Twin Earth substance as not water, 
then  externalism  receives  support;  if  not,  then  externalism  does  not 
receive support. Externalism stands or falls because of how our concepts 
are structured. Another matter, one that I will investigate in the present 
thesis, is what it is about natural kind concepts that causes some terms to 
refer externalistically.
1.3. The structure of the introductory essay
I will proceed as follows. First,  in section (2), I will examine theories of 
concepts  in  psychology,  and  argue  that  each  of  them,  as  typically 
interpreted, is inadequate as a theory of reference. This is mainly because 
they all  fall  prey to the Kripkean problems of  ignorance and error. An 
exception is Jerry Fodor’s account of concepts, where the reference of a 
concept  is  determined  by  specific  kind  of  causal  relations  between 
properties  and  the  speakers’  dispositions  to  token  the  concept.  I  will 
argue, however, that the account is implausible because it does not do any 
theoretical  work in its own right,  as it  doesn’t  explain what makes the 
reference-determining causal relations hold. Finally, in section (2.5) I will 
put  forward  a  dual  theory  of  concepts,  which  arguably  solves  the 
ignorance and error problems. On this account, natural kind concept cores 
are structured roughly  as  psychological  essentialism suggests,  with the 
exception that the essence beliefs involve a belief in an  external essence 
determining category membership.
In section (3) I will turn to philosophical theories of reference, which 
fall mainly into two classes, description and causal theories. I argue that 
the  description  theory  is  undermined  by  the  ignorance  and  error 
problems,  and  that  it  also  conflicts  with  findings  in  experimental 
psychology of concepts. The causal theory, on the other hand, falls prey to 
the  so-called  qua-  and composition  problems.  These problems manifest 
that causal relations alone are not sufficient to determine the reference of 
a term, and that some identificatory knowledge must also be utilised in 
reference  fixing.  I  argue  that  refining  both  the  description  and  causal 
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theory of reference leads to an account practically identical to the dual 
theory I am defending.
I conclude by, first, discussing some of the major differences between 
the proposed dual  theory and the traditional  philosophical  accounts of 
reference. Second, I will briefly investigate a dual theory’s applicability to 
some other  concepts  than natural  kind concepts.  Third,  I  will  examine 
how the dual theory meets the demands typically posited for a theory of 
concepts, arguing that it may have important advantages over the other 
theories  in  some  areas.  Finally,  I  will  apply  the  dual  theory  to  the 
philosophical issue about rigid predicates, arguing that the fact that natural 
kind  concepts  are  essentialistically  structured  does  all  the  theoretical 
work expected of rigidity.
1.4. Terms and concepts
As the reader may already have noticed, at times I talk about the reference 
or use of terms, and at others about the reference and use of concepts. I will 
take  it  that  both  terms  and  concepts  can  refer  and  can  be  used  in 
categorisation.  The  difference  between  concepts  and  terms  is  that  the 
former  are  mental  representations  whereas  the  latter  are  linguistic 
objects.  A (lexical)  concept is associated with its corresponding term in 
the mind of a speaker, or a translation of the term: for instance, an English 
speaker associates with the concept  CAT the term ‘cat’, a Finnish speaker 
the term ‘kissa’, and a Swedish speaker the term ‘katt’. The concept CAT can 
be  shared  between  speakers  of  different  languages,  whereas  a  term 
typically  is  not  shared.  I  will  suppose  that  the  reference  of  a  term  is 
determined by its corresponding concept, or, as in the case of natural kind 
terms, by the concept as a function of some external facts. For instance, 
the  reference  of  the  term  ‘cat’  is  determined  by  the  concept  CAT as  a 
function  of  what  kind  of  creatures  are  actually  called  ‘cats’.  The  fine 
details of the term / concept distinction are not important for the topics 
of  this  thesis;  for  a discussion on the distinction,  see e.g.  Margolis  and 
Laurence (2006).
2. THEORIES OF CONCEPTS
In this section, I  examine the most prominent theories of concepts put 
forward in psychology and cognitive science. I do not intend to provide an 
extensive review of the theories here, but only focus on how they manage 
in explaining reference (for a more detailed review, see e.g. Murphy 2004). 
My  discussion  in  this  section  partly  draws  on  the  valuable  review  by 
Laurence and Margolis (1999).
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2.1. The classical view
According to the classical view, concepts are definitions, which give the 
necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  for  both  their  semantic  and  non-
semantic application. For instance, the concept  BACHELOR might consist of 
represented features like  unmarried,  adult, and  male;  WATER of represented 
features like liquid, odourless, colourless, thirst-quenching, and so on. On this 
view,  a  concept  C  semantically  applies  to  an  object  x  if  and  only  x 
possesses each of the features represented in C. Likewise, an object x is 
categorised  as  C  if  and  only  if  it  is  reckoned  to  possess  the  features 
represented in C. On the classical view categorisation is a psychological 
process  of  ‘checking’  whether  an  object  has  the  features  that  make  it 
belong in the extension of C. 
The  classical  view  is  undermined  both  on  theoretical  grounds  as  a 
theory  of  reference,  and  on  experimental  grounds  as  a  theory  of 
categorisation.  The  following  two  sections  will  be  concerned  with 
problems of the first kind, and the third with problems of the second kind.
2.1.1. Plato’s and Wittgenstein’s problems
Probably the earliest argument against the classical view is the so-called 
Plato’s problem, which is that very few concepts in fact have definitions (at 
least as far as we know). This problem is especially pressing in the case of 
philosophical  concepts.  Despite  over  two  millennia  of  hard  reflection, 
thought  experimentation,  and argumentation,  no one has yet  come up 
with  generally  accepted  definitions  for  concepts  like  KNOWLEDGE,  JUSTICE, 
GOODNESS,  TRUTH,  or  BEAUTY,  just to name a few. Related to this  difficulty is 
Wittgenstein’s problem about family resemblances, which pertains also to 
ordinary (non-philosophical)  concepts,  such as  GAME.  Wittgenstein (1968) 
points  out  that  some  categories  are  not  definable  with  the  help  of 
necessary and sufficient conditions,  but their  members may share only 
partially overlapping sets of features, or possibly even no features at all. 
For example, there is nothing that is common to all games, but various 
games share only some similarities with each others: some games involve 
winning and losing, others don’t, some involve a ball, others don’t, some 
involve only one person and others many.
These two problems are directed at the classical view’s commitment 
about the  structure  of concepts, namely that they are definitions instead 
of, say, sets of family-related features. They also affect how plausible the 
theory is as a theory of reference: if (some) categories cannot be captured 
in definitions, then a definition cannot possibly determine what belongs 
in the concept’s extension. 
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2.1.2. Ignorance and error problems
The ignorance and error problems were originally raised by Kripke (1980) 
against  the  description  theory  of  reference,  or  descriptivism,  in  short. This 
account holds that the reference of a term is determined by a description 
associated with it  (in  the mind of  the  speaker).  For instance,  the term 
‘bachelor’ refers to any object that satisfies the description unmarried adult  
male, or the term ‘water’ refers to whatever satisfies the description  the  
odourless, colourless, thirst-quenching substance that falls from the sky and fills  
lakes  and  seas (and  so  on).  Laurence  and  Margolis  (1999)  adapt  these 
arguments against the classical view of concepts since, as they note, the 
classical theory is basically just ‘descriptivism applied to concepts’ (p. 21). 
Insofar as the ignorance and error arguments undermine the description 
theory of reference, they also undermine the classical view of concepts. 
Kripke’s arguments were concerned with natural kind terms and proper 
names; in this section I will be concerned solely with natural kind terms.
Let us start with the error problems. To take a simple example, many 
people  don’t  know  anything  about  leprosy  but  only  believe  that  the 
disease causes limbs and organs to fall off. This belief is, however, false. 
Descriptivism implies that in this case the term ‘leprosy’ does not in fact 
refer  to  the  disease  commonly  called  ‘leprosy’,  as  the  disease  doesn’t 
actually cause limbs and organs to fall off. This, however, is implausible: if 
the speakers did not manage to refer to leprosy in the first place, how 
could they have been wrong about the nature of the disease? It seems that 
the speakers did manage to refer to leprosy with their term, but only had 
a false belief about its nature. Other examples of the error problem are 
easy  to  come up  with:  for  instance,  alchemists  believed  that  gold  is  a 
compound that could be manufactured by combining other substances, 
Aristotle  believed  that  water  and  fire  are  elements,  the  phlogiston 
theorists believed that fire is a process where a substance is released from 
matter. Intuitively speaking, despite their false beliefs, these speakers still 
managed to refer to gold, water, and fire, respectively. It seems clear that 
they were wrong about the nature of these kinds, but if they failed to refer 
to them, this couldn’t have been so.
Ignorance problems are even more abundant than problems of error. 
The  problem  is  that  the  speakers’  identifying  knowledge  of  the  kind 
referred  to  is  often  insufficient  to  determine  the  term’s  extension. 
Consider the term ‘water’, for instance. At the time when the molecular 
structure of  water was not  known, the description associated with the 
term  ‘water’  arguably  consisted  mainly  of  water’s  perceptual  and 
functional  features.  Such  a  description  fails  to  pick  out  uniquely  the 
natural  kind  we  are  accustomed  to  refer  to  as  ‘water’  (that  is,  H2O); 
2. Theories of Concepts 21
instead,  it  picks  out  any kind  that  happens  to  satisfy  the  description, 
irrespectively of its deep structure (such as Putnam’s (1975) XYZ). Or, take 
the leprosy example again. Before the discovery that leprosy is caused by 
the bacterium  Mycobacterium leprae, the disease was arguably recognised 
in  virtue  of  some  symptomatic  description.  There  can,  however,  be 
diseases which cause symptoms similar to those caused by leprosy, but 
which  are  nevertheless  not  caused  by  Mycobacterium  leprae.  Thus,  the 
identifying description failed to uniquely pick out leprosy.
2.1.3. Problems in explaining categorisation
The  above  problems  stem  from,  generally  speaking,  normative  issues 
about the correct use of concepts, in contrast to contingent matters of how 
people  actually  happen  to  use concepts.  Plato’s  and  Wittgenstein’s 
problems concerned whether categories  can be captured in definitions; 
that is, whether a definition can delineate which all objects truly belong in 
a  category.  Kripke’s  problems,  in  turn,  present  a  challenge  to  whether 
descriptions  or  definitions  can determine reference:  it  is  argued that  a 
speaker  can  manage  to  refer  despite  having  erroneous  or  insufficient 
identificatory knowledge about the category members. Yet concepts  on 
the classical view are supposed not only to determine reference or true 
category  boundaries,  but  also  be  causally  responsible  for  people’s 
categorisation judgements. Whether the account manages in this task is 
an  empirical  matter.  Let  us  next  briefly  examine  the  experimental 
evidence against the definition theory.
The weightiest  evidence against  the  classical  view in  categorisation 
comes from the so-called typicality effects  in categorisation (see e.g. Rosch 
1999). The classical view entails that every member of a category has an 
equal footing in the category, but several studies have shown that subjects 
judge some instances of a category to be more or less typical than others—
for instance, apples and plums are judged to be more typical fruits than 
figs  and olives,  cars  more typical  vehicles  than tricycles,  murder  more 
typical a crime than blackmail, and so on (Rosch 1973, table 3). Rosch and 
Mervis  (1975)  showed that  the  judged typicality  of  a  category  member 
corresponds to its family resemblance with other members of the category: 
the more features a category member shares with other members of the 
category, the more typical it is judged, and vice versa. The typicality of a 
category  member  reliably  predicts  a  range  of  other  psychological 
phenomena.  Most  importantly,  typicality  judgements  correlate  with 
subjects’ speed in confirming category statements: the higher the judged 
typicality  of  an object  (or  subcategory)  x  in  a  category  C,  the  faster  a 
sentence  of  the  type  ‘x  is  a  C’  is  confirmed.  For  instance,  a  banana is 
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confirmed as a fruit more quickly than a strawberry, a car is confirmed as 
a vehicle more quickly than a tank, and so on. (Rosch 1973, pp. 136 – 137.) 
Typical  members  or  subcategories  of  a  category  are  also  more  easily 
learned and recalled, they develop earlier in infancy, and the typicality of 
a  category  member  determines  how  sensitive  it  is  to  priming (that  is, 
whether  advance  information  about  the  category  facilitates  or  inhibits 
categorisation judgements). (See Rosch 1999, pp. 198 – 199.) Even though 
these findings don’t straightforwardly contradict the classical theory, they 
undermine it because the account has no theoretical equipment to deal 
with them. On the other  hand,  these  same data support the prototype 
view of concepts, which will be the topic of the next section.
On the  basis  of  the  accumulating  experimental  data  against  it,  the 
classical  view  has  been  quite  unanimously  abandoned  as  a  theory 
categorisation  (for  an  overview  of  the  progress,  see  Smith  and  Medin 
1981). This data does not, however, straightforwardly undermine it as a 
theory of reference, or as a theory of the semantic cores of concepts. The 
definition view can be modified to solve many of the ignorance and error 
problems,  and  such  a  view  still  has  some  popularity  in  philosophy  of 
language (see e.g. Jackson 1998, Lewis 1984). I will examine this view in the 
section devoted to philosophical  theories  of  reference, now let’s  take a 
look  at  the  prototype  and  exemplar  theories  which  superseded  the 
classical theory.
2.2. Prototype and exemplar theories
We already examined  briefly  the  typicality  effects  that  undermine  the 
definition theory. These same data support the prototype theory, originally 
formulated in the writings of Eleanor Rosch and her colleagues (e.g. Rosch 
1999).
The prototype theory equates concepts with (or holds that concepts 
have) prototypes. Prototypes are sets of represented features just like on 
the  definition  theory,  but  this  time  the  features  don’t  form  singly 
necessary  and  jointly  sufficient  conditions  for  category  membership. 
Instead, an object may belong in a concept’s extension even if it doesn’t 
possess  each and every one of  the represented features.  Unlike  on the 
definition theory, the features in a prototype are not equally important 
for  category membership, but each feature is assigned a  typicality value. 
The typicality  value of a feature in a prototype is the higher the more 
salient  or  frequently  occurring  the  feature  is  among  the  category 
members.  For instance, most birds fly,  sing,  are small,  and lay eggs,  so 
these features receive relatively  high typicality values in the prototype 
BIRD.  According to  the prototype theory,  an object  is  categorised in the 
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extension  of  a  concept  if  it  is  sufficiently  similar  to  the  prototype. 
Typically  a  prototype  is  assigned  a  threshold  value which specifies  how 
similar an object needs to be with the prototype in order to be categorised 
in the concept’s extension; on such accounts membership in a prototype 
category  is  (aside  from  borderline  cases)  all-or-none.  However,  a 
prototype  can  also  be  taken  to  lack  a  threshold  value,  in  which  case 
membership in a prototype category is graded: an object’s membership in 
a category is determined by its similarity to the category prototype (see 
Osherson and Smith 1981).
To illustrate, let’s consider an (simplified) example. Suppose that the 
prototype CAT consists of the features has cat shape, which has the typicality 
value .9, meows (typicality .8), has whiskers (.7) and preys mice (.6). Further, 
suppose  that  the  similarity  between  an  object  x  and  a  prototype  P  is 
calculated according to Amos Tversky’s (1977) ‘contrast principle’ (here I 
and J are sets of x’s and P’s features, respectively):
(CP) Sim (I,J) = af (I  J) – b∩ f (I – J) – cf (J – I)
The constants  a,  b,  and c allow different weights  to be assigned to the 
shared features (I  J) and the two sets of distinctive features (I – J) and (J∩  
– I); for simplicity’s sake I suppose that each constant is 1. The function f 
assigns each features in the sets I and J a typicality value: it assigns .9 to 
the feature  has  cat  shape,  the value .8  to  the feature  meows,  and so on. 
Lastly, we may assign the similarity measure some threshold value which 
any object needs to exceed in order to trigger the prototype; let’s suppose 
that the measure for the prototype CAT is 1.5. Now, suppose that an object x 
has  cat  shape,  meows,  and  has  whiskers  but  doesn’t  prey  mice.  The 
similarity between x and  CAT is, then (.9 + .8 + .7) – .6 – 0 = 1.8. Since the 
similarity between x and  CAT exceeds the threshold value 1.5 associated 
with CAT, the object x is categorised as a cat. An object with another set of 
features can also trigger the prototype: suppose that an object has all the 
other  prototypical  features  of  cats  but  lacks  whiskers.  This  time  the 
similarity measure is (.9 + .8 + .6) – .7 – 0 = 1.6, so the object is likewise 
categorised as a cat. (On the other hand, if an object either lacks cat shape 
or doesn’t meow, it is not categorised as a cat.)
The  prototype  theory  differs  from  the  definition  theory  in  two 
important respects: First, as the above example illustrates, an object need 
not possess all the features represented in a prototype to be categorised in 
the concept’s extension, but only sufficiently many of them. This makes it 
impossible to capture prototype categories in conjunctive definitions or 
descriptions, where each feature is necessary for category membership. 
Moreover,  even  if  we  allow  the  definitions  or  descriptions  to  be 
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disjunctive, they easily become so complex as to make them trivial, for the 
disjunction  must  contain  all  of  the  different  sets  of  features  that  can 
trigger  the  prototype  (consider  Wittgenstein’s  example  about  the 
category  of  games).  Second,  unlike  on  the  definition  theory,  on  the 
prototype  account objects  that  fall  under a  concept’s  extension do not 
have an equal footing in the category.  A category member can possess 
different numbers of the features represented in the prototype, and the 
possessed features can have different typicality values, causing that the 
category  members  can  be  more  or  less  typical  of  the  category.  For 
instance, robins and sparrows are more typical birds than penguins and 
chickens, since the former possess more of the typical bird features than 
the latter. Thus, the prototype theory receives support from the typicality 
effects  in  categorisation,  which  undermine  the  definition  view.  (For 
reviews see Smith & Medin 1981; Murphy 2004.)
The exemplar view
Whereas on the prototype view a concept consists of features abstracted 
from category  members,  on the exemplar view the concept consists  of 
representations of the typical exemplars themselves. The exemplars may 
be either  some specific  instances  or  sub-categories  of  the  concept.  For 
instance,  a  subject’s  concept  CAT might  consist  of  representations  some 
particular cats, say, Oliver and Ronja, and possibly also representations of 
some subcategories of cats, such as the Siamese, feral cat, and so on. On 
this view, an object is categorised as a cat if  it is sufficiently similar to 
(some  of)  the  represented  exemplars.  As  on  the  prototype  theory,  an 
object  need  not  possess  each  of  the  features  of  the  exemplars  to  be 
categorised, but only some criterial number of them. (See e.g. Smith and 
Medin 1999; Murphy 2004, chapter 4.)
Gregory Murphy (2004) distinguishes between two kinds of support for 
the  exemplar  theory;  one  from  exemplar  effects  and  the  other  from 
exemplar  models.  The  former  is  relatively  simple  to  understand:  for 
instance, suppose in all my life I have seen an espresso machine only once 
and don’t have an idea what espresso machines typically look like. Upon 
meeting a weird looking machine in a department store, I  might try to 
figure  out  whether  it  is  an  espresso  machine  by  comparing  it  to  my 
memory of the particular espresso machine I have met. Similar examples 
are easy to come up with.  Support from exemplar models  involves the 
specific theoretical layout of the exemplar models, which has proven to be 
more successful than prototype models in explaining some experimental 
findings.
It is still open whether the prototype or exemplar theory will prove 
correct,  or  whether  they  can  somehow  be  made  compatible.  The 
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differences between these two theories  are quite  subtle,  and irrelevant 
from the present perspective, as they agree on most major issues: both 
hold  that  an  object  is  categorised  in  a  concept’s  extension  if  it  is 
sufficiently similar to the prototype or set of exemplars.
2.2.1. Ignorance and error problems
The  prototype  and  exemplar  theories  have  proved  to  have  great 
explanatory force in explaining relatively simple and fast categorisation, 
but they face difficulties in accounting for more considered judgements, 
and  especially  reference.  (It  is  notable  that  some  theorists  don’t  take 
prototypes or exemplars to determine reference at all; see Smith, Medin, 
and Rips 1984.) From our perspective the main problem for the similarity 
based views is that objects which do not trigger the prototype, or which 
aren’t sufficiently similar to the represented exemplars, may nevertheless 
belong  in  the  category.  And  vice  versa,  objects  that  do  trigger  the 
prototype  or  do  bear  sufficient  similarity  to  the  exemplars  may 
nevertheless not belong in the category. For instance, gold in gaseous form 
does not possess sufficiently many of the prototypical features of gold to 
be categorised as gold, and neither does it resemble the exemplars of gold 
we have met. However, it still is gold, and is arguably even categorised as 
gold by anyone who knows it possesses the actual deep structure of gold. 
On the other hand, an object can trigger the prototype or resemble the 
exemplars  of  a  category  but  nevertheless  not  really  belong  in  it.  For 
example, many corals and anemones arguably do trigger  the prototype 
PLANT and resemble the represented plant-exemplars, but are nevertheless 
animals. Moreover, they are even categorised as animals by any one who 
knows  about,  say,  their  functioning  (e.g.,  that  they  eat  instead  of 
assimilate) or deep structure (e.g., that they consist of animal cells instead 
of plant cells). Or, to take an example from the psychological literature, a 
cat cleverly disguised to look like a skunk may trigger the prototype SKUNK 
and resemble the represented skunk exemplars, but nevertheless fail to be 
a real skunk. Moreover, it is not categorised as a skunk by anyone who is 
aware of the make-up process (cf. Keil 1989). Similar examples are easy to 
come up with.
Cases like these undermine the prototype theory both as a theory of 
considered categorisation and reference.  At least in the case of  natural 
kind concepts, people’s categorisation judgements are not driven solely by 
prototypical  features, or by superficial  resemblance to some exemplars, 
but some unperceivable deep features can override them. The prototype 
and exemplar  theories  are  even less  plausible  as  theories  of  reference: 
triggering  a  prototype  or  resembling  a  set  of  exemplars  is  neither 
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necessary nor  sufficient  for  category membership:  gaseous gold  is  gold 
though  it  does  not  trigger  the  prototype  of  gold  or  resemble  the 
represented  gold  exemplars,  and fool’s  gold  is  not  gold  though it  does 
trigger  the  prototype  of  gold  and  resemble  the  represented  gold 
exemplars.
Some  prototype  theorists  have  tried  to  accommodate  for  these 
problems  by  allowing  deep  features  to  be  included  in  prototypes  (e.g. 
Hampton 1998,  p.  138).  For  instance,  the prototype  or  exemplar  set  of 
flowers could include a representation that some vital fluids flow inside 
them, that they turn towards the sun, that they die if not given sufficient 
sunlight,  water,  and nutrients,  and so on.  This  makes  it  possible  for  a 
subject to distinguish a silk flower from a real one, but does not preclude 
more  profound  possibilities  of  ignorance  and  error:  for  instance,  the 
apparent flower may not eventually belong in the division Magnoliophyta 
like  the  plants  we  ordinarily  call  ‘flowers’,  but  might  have  a  different 
lineage  and  genome.  As  Kripke  and  Putnam  have  showed,  almost  any 
specific beliefs about a natural category may turn out to be false.
The  ignorance  and  error  problems  show  that  concepts  cannot  be 
merely  prototypes or sets of exemplars.  However, these problems by no 
means  undermine  the  theories  as  accounts  of  quick,  rough-and-ready 
categorisation.  The  theories  receive  strong  support  in  explaining 
categorisation  of  this  kind,  and  it  doesn’t  matter  at  all  if  such 
categorisation judgements can be false—it suffices to confirm the theories 
that,  in  those  specific  kind  of  categorisation  tasks  the  theories  model, 
people  as a matter of fact do use concepts in the way predicted. Evidence 
for  the  prototype  or  exemplar  views  can  even  be found in  some non-
human animals (see e.g. Aydin & Pearce 1994; Werner & Rehkämper 2001), 
which suggests that we are dealing with a profound, hard-wired cognitive 
process. There is no reason to reject the theories completely because of 
the ignorance and error problems.
The most plausible response of the prototype and exemplar theorists 
to  the ignorance and error problems is  that  they are  not  investigating 
considered categorisation judgements or reference at all, but rather only a 
relatively  constrained  class  of  categorisation  judgements:  quick 
categorisation based on readily perceivable features. How categorisation 
is made based on some deeper features is a different matter, which the 
prototype and exemplar theorists need not be concerned with; there can 
be several, qualitatively different categorisation processes. A strategy like 
this  is  endorsed  by  dual  theorists,  who  hold  that  concepts  have  two 
separate  components,  an  identification  procedure  and  a  semantically 
constitutive core: the former drives quick and unconsidered categorisation 
judgements  and  doesn’t  determine  reference,  whereas  the  latter 
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determines  more  considered  categorisation  judgements  and  is 
semantically constitutive. Laurence and Margolis ‘suspect that a model of 
this sort has widespread support in psychology’ (1999, p. 46). 
I will defend a variety of the dual theory in section (2.5). Before that, 
let us take a look at what’s possibly the most important argument against 
the prototype theory, namely the claim that the theory cannot account 
for  compositionality.  Though  this  argument  pertains  mostly  to  the 
prototype  theory,  similar  considerations  can also  be  raised against  the 
exemplar view.
2.2.2. The composition problem
To begin with it should be noted that if we endorse a dual theory where 
prototypes  aren’t  semantically  constitutive,  the  composition  problem 
need  not  arise  at  all—it  suffices  for  conceptual  combination  that  the 
semantic  cores compose,  not  the identification  procedures.  We cannot, 
however,  ignore the composition problem solely  by appeal  to  the  dual 
theory, as even though some concepts arguably do have separate cores and 
identification procedures, not all concepts need to.
Accounting  for  compositionality  is  a  crucially  important  task  of  a 
theory  of  concepts.  We  can  form  a  practically  unlimited  number  of 
complex concepts  out  of  our limited set  of  primitive  concepts—we can 
form  novel  concepts  of,  say,  golden  chair,  wooden  bicycle,  miniature 
horse,  monster  apple,  and so on.  Complex  concepts  are  formed out  of 
more primitive ones: say, the concept MONSTER APPLE consists of the concepts 
MONSTER and  APPLE,  GOLDEN CHAIR of the concepts  GOLDEN and  CHAIR.  A theory of 
compositionality for concepts is expected to explain two distinct matters. 
First,  we  expect  the  theory  to  explain  how  concepts  compose  on  the  
semantic level, or how the extension of a complex concept is determined as 
a function of  its constituent concepts.  Second,  we expect the theory of 
compositionality to explain how concepts are composed in thought, or how 
subjects form complex mental representations out of simpler ones.
The classical theory of compositionality explains compositionality in two 
stages. The first stage is purely semantic. Andrew Connolly, Jerry Fodor, 
and Lila and Henry Gleitman write that, in the first stage of conceptual 
combination,
all  you  get  from  your  concepts  and  combinatorics  is  output  denoting  relations 
among sets, properties, or individuals (depending on the ontology assumed). Thus 
RED HAIR designates the set of instances of hair whose colours are instances of red. 
(2007, p. 4.)
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For  instance,  if  we  endorse  a  set-theoretic  approach  to  conceptual 
combination,  we may stipulate  that  the concept  RED HAIR designates  the 
intersection of the extensions of the concepts  RED and  HAIR. This explains 
how the semantic value of the complex expression RED HAIR is determined, 
but does nothing to account for how we form the representation of red 
hair. A specific problem here is to explain why some instances of red hair 
are more typical than others. For instance, in forming a thought of red 
hair, some hues come into mind more easily than others—say, orange red 
hair  is  more  typical  than  fire  engine  red  hair.  The  classical  theorists 
account for  this  by relying on another  stage  in  conceptual  processing, 
which involves ‘the application of a further set of pragmatic-inferential 
processes that draw on general knowledge of the world’ (Connolly et al. 
2007, p. 4). For instance, although red hair can be of any hue of red, I know 
from everyday experience that it typically is of just some specific hues. We 
will come back to the classical view after examining the possible problems 
that the prototype theory faces in accounting for compositionality.
The  main  problem  in  prototype  compositionality  stems  from  the 
influential critique by Daniel Osherson and Edward Smith (1981). Osherson 
and Smith take the prototype theory to entail that category membership 
can come in degrees, and because of this conceptual combination cannot 
be  modelled  in  traditional  theories  based  on  classical  logic.  Instead, 
Osherson and Smith suggest that conceptual combination of prototypes be 
modelled on  fuzzy set theory  (e.g. Zadeh 1965). Osherson and Smith argue 
that this approach has some deeply counter-intuitive consequences. Take, 
for instance, the complex concept  STRIPED APPLE.  Osherson and Smith take 
this concept’s extension to be determined by the fuzzy intersection of the 
extensions of the concepts  STRIPED and  APPLE.  This intersection, in turn, is 
determined by the so-called  Min Rule,  according to which an  object is a 
striped apple to the minimum of the degrees that it is striped and that it is 
an apple. This leads to a contradiction, as demonstrated by Osherson and 
Smith in the following way. 
Take a typical striped apple x. x is arguably more typical as a striped 
apple than as an apple, since prototypical apples aren’t striped. In other 
words, x has a higher degree of membership in the category of striped 
apples than in apples:
(1) cstriped apple(x) > capple(x).
(Where c denotes degree of category membership.) But now, the Min Rule 
implies that the striped apple x is a striped apple at most to the extent 
that it is an apple:
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(2) cstriped apple(x) ≤ capple(x). 
We have ended in a contradiction: intuitively, the striped apple x is a good 
instance  of  a  striped  apple,  but  it  is  a  bad  instance  of  an  apple.  But 
according to the Min Rule, x can be a striped apple only to the extent it is 
an apple. (Osherson and Smith 1981, pp. 43 – 45.) Similar examples are not 
hard to come up with: a guppy is atypical as a fish and atypical as a pet, 
but nevertheless typical as a pet fish (example from Osherson and Smith 
1981); a king’s golden throne is atypical as a sample of gold and atypical as 
a chair, but nevertheless typical as a golden chair; and so on.
Response strategies to Osherson and Smith’s problems can be divided 
into  two  classes:  some  have  suggested  further  logical  or  semantic 
strategies to deal with the problems of vague concepts. For instance, Hans 
Kamp  and  Barbara  Partee  (1995)  suggest  that  prototype  concept 
combination be modelled on the basis of supervaluation theory, on which a 
vague expression can be ‘precisified’ so that it attains a definite extension 
(see Kamp and Partee 1995, p. 148 ff.). A wholly different approach to the 
problems is to try to provide not a semantic or logical, but a psychological 
model of prototype combination. The goal of such a theory is to account 
for how a complex concept inherits the typical features of its constituent 
prototypes—say,  why  PET FISH inherits  from the concept  PET features like 
cuteness  and relatively  small  size  but  not  features  like  having fur  and 
waving tail. Connolly et al. (2007, p. 6) title the most prominent theories of 
this variety default to the stereotype accounts. 
One  especially  promising  variety  of  the  default  to  the  stereotype 
account is the selective modification model (Smith, Osherson, Rips, & Keane 
1988).  On this  account,  the feature representations  in  a  prototype may 
take  different  values  depending  on  which  concept  the  prototype  is 
combined  with.  For  instance,  the  concept  APPLE may  contain  feature 
dimensions such as colour, shape, and texture,  on which the prototype 
can take various values, such as plain, striped, checked, or dotted on the 
texture  dimension.  A  complex  concept  is  formed  through  selectively 
modifying the value of a specific feature dimension of the prototype; say, 
the concept  STRIPED APPLE is  formed by changing the value of  the texture 
dimension in the  APPLE prototype from plain (or whatever is the typical 
texture of apples) to striped. This account has the advantage of accounting 
for why an object can be more typical as a striped apple than as either 
striped or an apple: it is typical a member of the concept APPLE where the 
texture  dimension  is  selectively  modified.  Similarly,  in  forming  the 
concept  PET FISH, the concept  PET affects feature dimensions of  FISH such as 
size and cuteness, but leaves the coat dimension intact.
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Though the default to the stereotype models may be on the right track, 
they face both theoretical and experimental problems (see Connolly et al. 
2007). A specific problem pertaining to the selective modification model is 
that concepts probably don’t have enough feature dimensions to enable 
exotic combinations. Consider, for instance, the concept MONSTER BANANA. It is 
doubtful that the concept BANANA contains a monstrosity dimension that can 
be modified by the concept MONSTER. A more general problem is that it may 
not  be possible  to  model conceptual  combination with the help of  any 
specific psychological model at all; rather, the process may involve highly 
sophisticated and versatile processes such as creative imagination, and it 
may  be  affected  by  personal  memories  (see  Wiesniewski  and  Gentner 
1991).  For  instance,  we need  not  suppose that  there  is  some universal 
cognitive process that determines how one forms a representation of, say, 
pre-school  teacher,  but  various  people’s  representations  of  pre-school 
teachers may be affected by their personal memories of some specific pre-
school teachers. These considerations point towards the classical theory 
of conceptual combination.
For some reason the classical theory of compositionality has not been 
adopted  for  prototype  concepts,  but  I  do  not  see  why  this  approach 
shouldn’t succeed. This account faces two kinds of problems. First there 
are problems pertaining to the first stage in conceptual combination. As 
we saw, Osherson and Smith (1981) argue that membership in prototype 
categories is graded, which makes modelling their semantics in classical 
logic and set theory impossible. In particular, both Osherson and Smith’s 
fuzzy  set  theory  and  Kamp  and  Partee’s  supervaluation  theory  are 
problematic.  Again,  there  are  problems  pertaining  to  the  second, 
psychological  stage  in  conceptual  processing—in  particular,  we  have 
reason to doubt that the composition of thought could be modelled in any 
specific, simple model such as the selective modification model. However, 
the prospects for a classical theory of prototype composition are not as 
dim as they might seem.
I take that the crucial stage in conceptual combination on the classical 
theory  is  the  first  one,  and  that  the  prototype  theory  has  no  special 
problems in accounting for it.  The reason for  this  is  twofold.  First,  the 
problems that beset Osherson and Smith, and Kamp and Partee stemmed 
from  considering  membership  in  prototype  category  graded,  but  the 
prototype  theory  needs  not  make  such  a  commitment.  A  plausible 
variation of the prototype theory is one where prototypes have threshold 
values, and on which an object is categorised in the prototype’s extension 
if  its  similarity  to  it  exceeds the  threshold value.  On such an account, 
membership  in  prototype  categories  is  all-or-none  (borderline  cases 
aside). Providing logic and semantics for such prototypes is, then, much 
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less problematic than providing semantics for graded categories: at best 
we can do with classical logic  (if  we ignore the borderline cases),  or at 
worst  with  three  value  logic  (if  we want to  take borderline  cases  into 
account).  Second,  and  more  importantly,  if  some  concepts  are  indeed 
vague in that membership in them is graded, they are so  irrespectively of  
the prototype theory.  Consider, for instance, concepts such as  BALD,  RED,  or 
STEEP. We can take it that,  as a matter of fact, some people are more or less 
bald than others, that some objects are redder than others, or that some 
slopes are steeper than others. Providing the semantics and logic for such 
vague concepts is a general problem that belongs mainly to philosophy of 
language, logic, and linguistics, not the prototype theory—some concepts 
simply are, irrespectively of the prototype theory, vague (see e.g.  Keefe 
2000). Fodor and Lepore (1996) notice this same point but try to turn it 
against the prototype theory, which is in my opinion illegitimate.
Of course, nothing said thus far helps in solving the second stage in 
conceptual  combination  on  the  prototype  model.  In  specific,  even  if 
prototypes could compose according to classical or three value logic, we 
would  still  have  to  explain  how  speakers  form  representations  of  the 
complex prototypes,  and in particular,  what determines their typicality 
values. I dare claim that this stage is not, however, crucially important in 
conceptual  combination.  Typically  the  first,  semantic  stage  suffices  for 
possessing a complex concept, and often a speaker may not have a specific 
representation of the complex concept at all. The case of Boolean concepts 
supports this presumption: a speaker can possess a Boolean concept such 
as NON-CAT even though she cannot form a specific representation (that is, a 
prototype) of the category (see Fodor and Lepore 1996). I take it that this 
is quite compatible with the prototype theory. We may suppose that the 
concept  CAT is  nothing  but  a  prototype,  and  that  it  refers  to  whatever 
triggers it.  Similarly, the concept  NON-CAT is  a combination of the logical 
modifier  NON and the prototype  CAT,  and it  refers  to  whatever  does  not  
trigger  the  prototype  CAT.  Similarly  for  any  other  Boolean  concepts:  a 
complex concept (C1 & C2),  where C1 and C2 are prototypes,  refers  to 
whatever triggers both the prototype C1 and C2; the concept (C1  ∨ C2) 
refers to whatever triggers C1 or C2; and so on.
This  approach  raises,  however,  a  problem:  it  seems  that  on  this 
account,  not  all  concepts  are  prototypes,  after  all.  For  instance,  the 
concept  NON-CAT quite  clearly  is  not  a  prototype,  as  it  lacks a  prototype 
altogether  (Fodor  and  Lepore  (1996)  call  this  the  missing  prototypes 
problem and consider it  as counterevidence to the prototype theory).  I 
suppose that  it  is  theoretically  possible  that  a  speaker  could possess  a 
complex  concept  like  MONSTER BANANA simply  in  virtue  of  possessing  its 
constituent prototypes MONSTER and BANANA (and grasping some basic logic), 
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without forming a representation of it at all: the complex concept would 
refer to whatever triggers both the prototypes  MONSTER and  BANANA.  So, it 
might well be that the prototype theorist has to grant that (at least some) 
complex concepts, even if they are formed out of prototypes, simply are 
not prototypes themselves. I do not consider this a major problem for the 
prototype theory: prototypes can compose, even though what results from 
the  combination  need  not  be  prototypes  themselves,  but  logical 
compounds of prototypes.
More extensive discussion of the composition problem lies beyond the 
scope of this introduction. However, we may conclude that the prototype 
theory is by no means undermined by the composition problem, but it has 
viable strategies of dealing with it. I have argued that one such strategy is 
to endorse a classical view of conceptual combination. However, even if 
the prototype theory could account for composition, it still is viable only 
as a theory of some restricted class of concepts. In particular, it is doomed 
to failure at least in the case of natural kind concepts, since in their case it 
falls  prey  to  the  ignorance  and  error  problems.  Let’s  examine  next 
whether  the  latest  trend  in  the  psychology  of  concepts  succeeds  any 
better with these problems.
2.3. The theory-theory of concepts
The notion of a theory-theory of concepts can be considered as an umbrella 
term that encompasses a range of theories. Common to these accounts is 
that they are committed to the claim that (at least some) concepts are 
structured around,  and embedded in, naive mental theories  (e.g.,  Carey 
1985,  p.  198).  We may distinguish  between two research  trends  in  the 
theory-theory:  some  authors  have  focused  on  issues  about  conceptual 
development  (see  especially  Carey  1985;  1999),  whereas  others  have 
focused  on  issues  about  categorisation.  I  will  here  focus  solely  on  the 
latter  issue,  with  respect  to  which  the  theory-theory  endorses 
psychological essentialism.
2.3.1. Psychological essentialism
Psychological  essentialism  draws  from  Kripke’s  and  Putnam’s 
considerations  in  the  philosophy  of  language  (see  Keil  1989).  It  is 
motivated  by  the  fact  that  people’s  categorisation  judgements  are  not 
always driven solely by an object’s appearance, but are sometimes affected 
by  the  unobservable  deep  structure  of  the  sample.  Psychological 
essentialism is concerned specifically with natural kind concepts, which I 
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will focus on in this section; other varieties of essentialism will be briefly 
examined in section (4.2).
According to  psychological  essentialism,  people  believe that  natural 
kind  members  share  some  hidden,  unobservable  deep  structure,  the 
possession of which they take to be necessary and sufficient for belonging 
in  the  category.  For  instance,  it  is  believed  that  all  cats  share  some 
underlying  essence,  say,  genome,  lineage,  or  more  generally  ‘insides’, 
which determines what  belongs  in the category  of  cats.  The essence is 
considered necessary for a cat: even if a creature looked and behaved just 
like a cat, it might nevertheless not be one if it did not possess the cat 
essence.  The  essence  is  also  considered  sufficient:  even  if  a  creature 
doesn’t appear to be a cat or behave like one, it might still be a cat if it 
possesses the cat essence.
Psychological  essentialism typically takes the believed essence to be 
causal  in  nature:  it  is  some empirically  discoverable  property  or  set  of 
properties,  which  cause(s)  the  category  members’  other  typical 
properties. According to Susan Gelman (2003), essentialism posits people 
with a belief in some ‘substance, power, quality, process, relationship, or 
entity  that  causes  other  category-typical  properties  to  emerge  and  be 
sustained,  and  that  confers  identity’  (Gelman  2003,  p.  405).  The  most 
prominent variety of psychological essentialism is  placeholder essentialism 
(e.g. Medin & Ortony 1989; Rips 2001; Gelman 2003, 2004), which holds that 
speakers need not have any specific beliefs about a category’s essence, but 
only believe that the category members share some essence. For instance, 
a  subject  may  believe  that  something  about  a  substance’s  chemical 
composition makes it,  say, water, although she doesn’t know what that 
deep structure specifically is;  or  she may believe that something about 
cats’  genetic  makeup or lineage makes them cats,  although she doesn’t 
know what that genome or lineage specifically is. This empty placeholder 
belief about essence can be replaced with a specific essence hypothesis; for 
instance, the subject may come to believe that water is essentially H2O, or 
that the cat genome is some specific genome G.
Psychological  essentialism in categorisation  receives  support  mainly 
from  discovery and  transformation  studies.  For  instance,  Frank Keil  (1989) 
presented children with discovery scenarios, in one of which an animal 
that appeared to be a horse turned out to have the ‘blood and bones of 
cows’,  and came from cow parents and had cow offspring (p. 162).  Keil 
discovered that children tended to categorise the animal as a horse rather 
than a cow, that is, they favoured the animal’s insides and lineage over its 
appearance in categorising it. In the transformation studies an animal’s 
appearance  was  transformed,  but  its  insides  were  kept  constant.  For 
instance,  Keil  described  to  children  a  raccoon  that  had  been  cleverly 
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disguised to appear like a skunk; it had been painted with stripes and its 
body had been added a ‘sac of  super smelly odour’  (p. 184).  In another 
variation of the transformation study deeper manipulation was used; for 
instance, a young horse was  given an injection that made it grow up to 
appear like a zebra (p. 222). In both cases children tended to categorise 
according to  the deep structure of  the probe,  instead of  relying on its 
appearance. It is noteworthy that, in contrast to natural kinds, when the 
appearance and function of an artefact was changed, the children  did in 
fact take the object’s category to have been changed. For instance, when a 
coffeepot was made to look like and function as a birdfeeder, the subjects 
did in fact consider its category to have been changed (p. 184; p. 186 ff.). 
(For a  fairly  recent review of  experiments  supporting  essentialism,  see 
Gelman 2004.)
In  the  previous  section  we  saw  that  the  prototype  and  exemplar 
theories  were  viable  in  accounting  for  quick  rough-and-ready 
categorisation judgements, but that they couldn’t determine the reference 
of  (at  least)  natural  kind  concepts  due  to  the  ignorance  and  error 
problems.  They  can,  however,  serve  as  non-semantic  identification 
procedures of concepts on a dual theory where some other mechanism, 
the  concept  core,  determines  reference.  Could  the  essence  beliefs 
constitute  natural  kind  concept  cores?  Unfortunately,  the  present 
formulation of psychological essentialism is just as prone to the ignorance 
and error problems as any other of the discussed theories.
2.3.2. Ignorance and error problems
Laurence  and  Margolis  raise  ignorance  and  error  problems  against 
psychological essentialism, and argue that they undermine it as a theory 
of reference. These problems are made more difficult by the fact that the 
believed essences are supposed to be necessary and sufficient for category 
membership,  unlike  in  the case  of  the prototype  and exemplar  theory 
where an object need not possess all of the represented features to belong 
in  a  category.  People  often  have  erroneous  and  sketchy  beliefs  about 
essences,  but usually  they  nevertheless  manage to  refer.  To take some 
historical examples, Aristotle thought that earth, water, wind, and fire are 
elements, alchemists believed gold to be a compound, phlogiston theorists 
believed fire to be a process where a substance is released, and so on. If 
these  features  were  necessary  for  category  membership,  the  concepts 
couldn’t  have referred to  anything.  This,  however,  is  implausible,  as  it 
seems that the concepts did refer,  but that the speakers only had false 
beliefs about the essences of their referents.  More modern examples of 
cases of error can be found as well. For instance, skunks were formerly 
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thought  to  be  a  subfamily  of  the  Mustelidae family,  but  recent  genetic 
evidence suggests that they probably aren’t (Dragoo & Honeycutt 1997). If 
lineage  is  considered  as  an  essential  property  of  animal  species, 
psychological  essentialism implies  that  the term ‘skunk’  didn’t  refer  to 
anything. Similar examples are not hard to find. Some people still believe 
that  whales are fish,  that  air consists  mainly of  oxygen,  that  tomatoes, 
nuts, and grain aren’t fruits, and so on and so forth. In each of these cases 
it seems that, despite their false beliefs, the speakers managed to refer—
for  if  they  didn’t,  they  couldn’t  have  been  wrong about  the  nature of 
skunks, whales, air, and so on in the first place.
The  psychological  essentialists  acknowledge  these  problems 
themselves and hold that the essence beliefs cannot determine reference. 
Gelman holds that specific essences are rarely known by lay speakers, and 
because of  this  cannot  determine reference (2003,  pp.  9  –  10).  Douglas 
Medin and Andrew Ortony (1989) also notice that only in a few cases do 
the specific essence beliefs provide the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for category membership, because they rarely consist of a precise set of 
identificatory  features  (pp.  184  –  185).  These  observations  are  most 
probably true if we presume reference to be determined internalistically 
by  the  speakers’  identificatory  knowledge  alone.  In  section  (2.5)  I  will 
propose  an  alternative,  externalistic  formulation  of  psychological 
essentialism,  on  which  the  essence beliefs  can  in  fact  determine  word 
extensions, and can constitute natural kind concept cores. 
Laurence  and  Margolis  reject  the  essence  beliefs  as  constituting 
concept cores because of the ignorance and error problems, but endorse 
Fodor’s conceptual atomism with respect the cores. This is the view I will 
turn to next.
2.4. Concept atomism and informational semantics
Jerry Fodor’s theory of concepts is radically different from the traditional 
approaches discussed above. It holds that concepts are atomistic mental 
representations which are identified solely in virtue of their syntactical 
properties, or ‘mental orthography’ (e.g. Fodor 1998, p. 38). Any specific 
beliefs  or  psychological  capacities  (such as  essence beliefs or prototype 
driven  object  recognition  systems)  are  only  non-semantically associated 
with  them,  and  don’t  constitute  them.  On  Fodor’s  view  concepts  do 
nothing but carry information about the properties they refer to.
How,  then,  do  the  concepts  refer,  if  they  don’t  encode  any 
identificatory knowledge about the category members? Fodor’s answer is 
informational semantics: a concept refers to the property (or properties) 
which tends to cause it to be tokened. For instance, cats tend to cause us 
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to token  CAT, and chairs tend to cause us to token  CHAIR. This is the most 
basic informational theoretic assumption: 
IS1. It is a law that property  p is disposed to cause the concept C 
that expresses it to be tokened.
The problem for this simple formulation is obvious: some properties other 
than  the  one  the  concept  refers  to  can  cause  its  being  tokened;  for 
instance, cows perceived on a dark night from a distance can appear to be 
horses, and cause the concept HORSE to be tokened. This problem is usually 
known as the  disjunction problem:  why does a concept refer to a specific 
property instead of the disjunction of properties that tend to cause it to be 
tokened? To solve this  problem, Fodor introduces the following second 
claim:
IS2. If it is a law that any property  q other than  p is disposed to 
cause C to be tokened, then this lawful relation is asymmetrically 
dependent on the lawful relation between p and C.
Call  this  the  asymmetry  constraint.  It  basically  states  that  some  of  the 
property-concept  tokening  –relations  (or  p/C-relations  for  short)  are 
more primitive than others, in that the less primitive are dependent on 
the more primitive, but not vice versa. For instance, in the above example, 
the cow’s being disposed to cause the tokening of HORSE is dependent on the 
horse/HORSE-relation,  because  the  cow causes  the  tokening  of  HORSE only  
because  it  is  mistaken for  a  horse:  if  the speaker  perceived  the animal  in 
daylight and from a shorter distance, she would not call it ‘horse’. On the 
other hand, the horse/HORSE relation is primitive in that it is not dependent 
on  any  other  p/C-relations:  horses  trigger  the  concept  HORSE simply 
because they are  horses,  not  because they are  mistaken for  something 
else.  (See  Fodor  1990,  p.  90  ff;  Fodor  1998,  p.  120  ff.  On  specific 
formulations  of  informational  semantics,  see  also  Laurence  & Margolis 
1999, p. 61; Margolis 1998, p. 350 – 351.)
Fodor’s theory arguably survives the problems of ignorance and error, 
naturally enough, since it holds reference to be causally determined. For 
instance, the term ‘gold’ does in fact refer to gold in gaseous form, since 
the  gas  has  the  property  to  which  the  concept  GOLD is  asymmetrically 
connected to, namely the property of being Au. It is Au that actually tends 
to cause us to token  GOLD,  and since gold in gaseous form possesses that 
property, GOLD refers to it. Or, take XYZ, which is disposed to cause WATER to 
be tokened although it doesn’t really belong in the concept’s extension. 
Fodor solves this problem by claiming that the XYZ/WATER-relation is in 
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fact asymmetrically dependent on the H2O/WATER-relation: if the speaker 
knew that  the XYZ-sample is  of  a  different  kind than the actual  water 
samples, she would, according to Fodor,  not call  it  ‘water’—XYZ causes 
WATER to be tokened solely because it is mistaken for water (H2O). Finally, 
take an example of an error problem: people used to believe that whales 
are  (essentially)  fish,  but  despite  this  false  belief,  they  arguably  still 
managed to refer to whales. Fodor would solve this problem as follows: 
despite the false essence belief, it was still all along the property of being a 
whale which, as a matter of fact, caused us to token WHALE. It doesn’t matter 
for the concept’s reference that we believed the animals to be fish, only 
our actual concept tokening dispositions are relevant.
Fodor’s theory of concepts cannot be a complete theory if concepts are 
thought  to  do  more  than  just  refer.  In  particular,  concepts  on  Fodor’s 
account cannot possibly determine categorisation judgements, since they 
don’t  involve  any  specific  identificatory  knowledge.  Laurence  and 
Margolis suggest that concepts could still have atomistic cores, and that 
reference could be determined causally  as  Fodor suggests.  At the same 
time, prototypes, exemplars, and essence beliefs would have a role to play 
in  explaining (among other  things)  people’s  categorisation  judgements, 
but on this view they wouldn’t semantically constitute concepts. 
Laurence  and  Margolis’  suggestion  is  initially  plausible.  Prototypes, 
exemplar representations, and essence beliefs clearly determine people’s 
categorisation judgements, but they seem to be incapable of determining 
reference  due  to  the  ignorance  and  error  problems.  Causal  reference 
fixing  solves  this  problem,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  atomistic  concepts 
cannot determine categorisation. A natural solution to this stand-off is to 
endorse a dual theory of concepts where the concept cores are atomistic 
and  refer  causally,  and  the  identification  procedures  determine 
categorisation.  Unfortunately  for  this  variety  of  a  dual  theory,  Fodor’s 
account of concepts and reference is arguably mistaken. 
2.4.1. The problem with Fodor’s theory
How  do  properties  cause  concepts  to  be  tokened  on  Fodor’s  account? 
Properties  cannot  cause  concepts  to  be  tokened  directly,  especially  if 
concepts are taken to be atomistic and to not contain  any identificatory 
knowledge or specific psychological capacities. Fodor suggests that the p/
C-relations are mediated by some sustaining mechanisms (psychological or 
other capacities), but holds that they are semantically irrelevant:
[…] all  that matters for meaning is ‘functional’ relations between symbols and their 
denotations. In particular, it doesn’t matter how that covariation is mediated; it doesn’t 
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matter  what  mechanisms  (neurological,  intentional,  spiritual,  psychological,  or 
whatever) sustain the covariation. (1990, p. 56, emphasis original.)
To illustrate, we can recognise cows by eyesight, hearing, through indirect 
cues such as cow-piles,  or even utilising an electronic cow-radar. Since 
any of these mechanisms (it seems) sustains the same p/C-relations, they 
all determine reference to the same property, namely cow. In other words, 
the p/C-relations are multiply sustainable, and what in the end matters 
for reference are the purely functional p/C-relations alone.
Which  psychological  mechanisms  do  actually  sustain  the  p/C-
relations?  Quite  clearly,  they  are  the  mechanisms  driving  our 
categorisation  judgements:  to  be  disposed  to  token  a  concept  C in  the 
vicinity of a property  p is  simply to be disposed to  categorise  (an object 
instantiating) p under the extension of C. Experimental psychology shows 
that categorisation (or concept tokening behaviour) is probably caused by 
prototypes,  exemplars,  or essence beliefs.  But  if  it is  these mechanisms 
that determine the reference determining p/C-relations, how can they be 
irrelevant  for  a  concept’s  reference?  Fodor  would  reply,  as  the  above 
quote shows, that even if prototypes, exemplar sets, or essence beliefs do 
actually  sustain  the  p/C-relations,  the  very  same  p/C-relations  could  be  
sustained  by  some  other  mechanisms.  But  could  they?  This  is  a  crucially 
important question for Fodor’s account, since if the actual psychological 
mechanisms  were  necessary  for  the  p/C-relations,  they’d  also  be 
necessary for reference, and conceptual atomism would fail: in order to 
refer  with  a  concept,  one  would  have  to  possess  some  specific 
psychological capacity. 
The  key  to  noticing  the  problem  of  Fodor’s  account  is  that  the 
sustaining mechanisms, as they are actually modelled in the psychology of 
concepts, are just functional models of our categorisation dispositions. In 
Article  III  I  investigate  various  psychological  mechanisms  that  might 
actually  sustain  the  p/C-relations,  and  argue  that  each  of  them  is 
necessary for the p/C-relations they sustain to hold (with one exception). 
Informational atomism thus fails, since in order to refer with a concept it 
is necessary to possess some specific (functional) psychological capacity. 
Fodor’s  claim  that  the  sustaining  mechanisms  are  irrelevant  for  a 
concept’s reference would succeed if by sustaining mechanisms we meant 
some very specific  neural  or  biological  mechanisms;  it  wouldn’t matter 
whether the p/C-relations of a concept were sustained by, say, a neural 
mechanism M or a functionally equivalent electric mechanism M’. But the 
psychology  of  concepts  does  not  actually  investigate  any  physiological 
mechanisms. The psychologists examine human categorisation behaviour
—which objects  they tend to categorise in the extension of a concept in 
some specific  circumstances—and  build  functional  theories  that  model 
2. Theories of Concepts 39
this behaviour. So, the psychologists  model just people’s dispositions to 
token a concept, which Fodor claims to determine the concept’s reference, 
and their work is, thus, anything but irrelevant semantically.
2.4.2. Ignorance and error problems revisited
So,  Fodor’s  claim  about  the  semantic  irrelevance  of  the  sustaining 
mechanisms is  probably  false,  and  the mechanisms are  needed  for  the 
p/C-relations to hold. But doesn’t his causal theoretic account still solve 
the pressing ignorance and error problems, which undermined each one 
of  the  theories  we  examined  earlier?  It  will  turn  out  that  the  causal 
theoretic account shouldn’t receive this honour, since all the explanatory 
work  in  solving  the  ignorance  and  error  problems  is  done  by  the 
sustaining mechanisms.
Take, for instance, the case of gaseous gold. Fodor’s account implies 
that the concept GOLD refers to gold in gaseous form, since it possesses the 
property Au which normally causes the concept to be tokened. But why 
should  we take  it  that  the  concept  is  ordinarily  caused to  be  tokened 
specifically by the property Au? The objects that cause GOLD to be tokened 
in us can be considered to do so in virtue of two properties: the property of 
being Au and the property of being goldish (that is, being yellow, malleable, 
shiny, and so on). At least scientifically ignorant speakers are disposed to 
token the concept GOLD in the vicinity of any substance they reckon as gold, 
not just Au, so why should the concept’s reference be fixed specifically to 
Au? Fodor’s response is that the non-Au goldish substance/GOLD –relation 
is asymmetrically dependent on the Au/GOLD-relation: if the speaker knew 
that  some instance  of  a  non-Au  goldish  substance  is  different  in  deep 
structure from the bulk of the samples actually reckoned as gold (that is, 
Au), she would not call it ‘gold’. But this only brings us to a second, more 
profound  problem:  why  should  the  speaker  care  about  the  samples’  deep  
structures at all? What reasons does she have not to consider some sample 
with a deviant deep structure as gold? After all, many concepts are not 
sensitive  to  deep  structures:  say,  even  if  it  turned  out  that  all  chairs 
happen to share some molecular structure S,  we still  wouldn’t consider 
possessing S necessary for being a chair; we could easily manufacture a 
chair of some substance that doesn’t possess S. To take another example, 
consider Putnam’s XYZ. Fodor maintains that  WATER doesn’t refer to XYZ, 
because  the  XYZ/WATER-relation  is  asymmetrically  dependent  on  the 
H2O/WATER-relation; this, in turn, is because if a speaker knew that a sample 
of  a  watery  substance  does  not  share  deep  structure  with  the  actual 
watery samples, she wouldn’t reckon it water. But again: why should the 
speaker care about the sample’s deep structure at all? Why doesn’t she 
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simply conclude that there happens to be two kinds of water, XYZ and 
H2O?
The  obvious  solution  to  these  problems  is  that  the  speakers  intend 
(explicitly or implicitly) to use natural kind concepts to refer to a kind 
with  a  certain,  hidden  deep  structure.  Even  Fodor  acknowledges  that 
speakers  cannot  possibly  refer  to  natural  kinds  without  some  essence 
beliefs:
I’m quite  prepared to  believe  that,  de  facto,  until  we  had […]  the  concepts  that 
cluster around  NATURAL KIND, there was probably no way that we  could link to water 
except  […]  via  water’s  metaphysically  accidental  but  nomologically  necessary 
properties [that is, water’s appearance]. (1998, p. 158; emphasis original.)
In order to refer to H2O instead of any watery substance, or Au instead of 
any goldish substance, we must, even according to Fodor, possess essence 
beliefs. So, it’s the essence beliefs which cause us to stand in some specific 
kind of p/C-relations that do most of the work in fixing reference, not the 
purely causal p/C-relations themselves. It is  because of  the essence beliefs 
that we wouldn’t apply a concept C to a sample if we knew that it doesn’t 
share deep structure with the bulk of the actual C-samples.
Fodor’s theory of concepts fails, as reference cannot be determined purely 
causally,  but  rather  the  reference-determining  causal  relations  must 
themselves be determined by some specific psychological capacities. For 
this  reason,  Laurence  and  Margolis’  suggestion  about  the  dual  theory 
where  concepts  have  atomistic  cores  cannot  do.  However,  another 
variation  of  a  dual  theory  might  well  be  viable—the  idea  that  essence 
beliefs could form concept cores is not dead and buried yet.
2.5. Towards a dual theory of concepts
The essentialists claimed that essence beliefs cannot determine reference, 
since essences are rarely known by lay speakers, and beliefs about them 
are often imprecise and erroneous. This is indeed correct: people’s specific 
essence  beliefs  cannot  possibly  specify  category  boundaries.  But  the 
placeholder belief that the category members share some  hidden essence 
can determine reference, though not in the traditional, internalistic way, 
but  externalistically.  My  suggestion  is  that  people  believe  category 
boundaries  to  be  determined  by  the  hidden,  possibly  unknown,  deep 
structure or essence shared by the actual category members, even if no one  
knows  what  the  deep  structure  in  fact  is.  This  view,  call  it  externalistic  
essentialism, can be summarised as follows:
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(EE) 1. Speakers believe that samples falling under a natural kind 
concept  C  share  some  hidden,  empirically  discoverable, 
essence E.
2.  The  speakers  take  possessing  E  to  be  a  necessary  and 
sufficient condition for belonging in the extension of C.
Claim (1) simply reiterates psychological essentialism’s claim that people 
believe in a category essence. The crucial claim in (EE) is (2), which posits 
the  account  with  semantic  force:  it  holds  that  the  unknown  category 
essence can determine the concept’s extension even if no one knows what 
it is.
Externalistic  essentialism  is  motivated  both  theoretically  and 
experimentally.  Most  importantly,  the  suggestion  solves  the  pressing 
ignorance and error problems by being externalistic: for instance, gaseous 
gold belongs in the extension of GOLD in virtue of being Au like all the other 
samples typically categorised as gold; XYZ is not water since its chemical 
constitution  is  different  from actual  water.  Even  though  a  lay  speaker 
would arguably categorise gaseous gold as not gold and XYZ as water, she 
would be making a mistake, since the gas shares deep structure with the 
actual gold samples and XYZ is different in constitution from the actual 
water samples. Moreover, if the speaker knew about these facts, she would 
be  able  to  arrive  at  a  correct  categorisation  judgement.  However,  (EE) 
cannot be established purely on theoretical grounds, as it is committed to 
the  empirical  claim  (2)  that  people  in  fact  take  natural  category 
membership to be determined by the category members’ deep structure, 
even if it is unknown. In Article II we argue that externalistic essentialism 
has  experimentally  testable  consequences  which  distinguish  it  from 
internalistic  theories  of  concepts.  We present  two  experiments,  which 
support the externalistic essentialist view.
It  is  quite  clear  that  the  externalistic  essence  beliefs  cannot  alone 
determine the reference of  natural kind concepts.  The main reason for 
this  is  that  the essence of  a category C is  supposed to be found in the 
actual  instances  of  C,  so  something  apart  from  essence  beliefs  must 
determine what is counted in the category in the first place. This is where 
the  identification  procedure  comes  into  the  picture:  the  identification 
procedure determines which objects are ordinarily reckoned as C, and it is 
those  objects  whose  deep structure (if  they  share any)  determines  the 
category  boundaries.  Experimental  psychology  suggests  that  the 
identification  procedures  typically  consist  of  prototype  or  exemplar 
representations,  which  consist  of  the  category  members’  typical 
perceptual  features.  However,  the  identification  procedure  can  also 
contain  theoretical  beliefs  and  beliefs  about  essences,  which  can  also 
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guide  our  particular  categorisation  judgements—for  instance,  we  don’t 
categorise anemones as plants despite their plant-like appearance, and we 
don’t  categorise  dolphins  as  fish  despite  their  fishy  appearance.  It  is 
important to distinguish these specific  theoretical or essence beliefs from 
the  externalistic  placeholder  beliefs.  The  former  can  constitute  the 
identification  procedure  and  don’t  determine  reference,  whereas  the 
latter  constitute  the  core  and  do  determine  reference  (together  with 
external facts). Importantly, the specific essence beliefs can be erroneous: 
for  instance,  whales  were  earlier  believed  to  be  (essentially)  fish,  but 
despite this false essence belief,  the speakers still  arguably managed to 
refer to whales in virtue of the animals’ external essence.
We  have  ended  up  with  a  dual  theory,  where  the  semantically 
constitutive cores of natural kind concepts consist of placeholder essence 
beliefs,  and  the  identification  procedures  consist  of  prototypes, 
exemplars, and specific theoretical or essence beliefs (as far as we know; 
they might also contain other representations or capacities). On this dual 
theory,  the  reference  of  a  natural  kind  concept  is  determined  by  the 
concept’s  essentialist  core  as  a  function  of  what  actually  triggers  the 
concept’s identification procedure:
 
(DTR) A natural kind concept C applies to x iff x shares some deep 
structure, believed to be essential, with most of the samples that 
actually trigger the identification procedure of C of some relevant 
speakers.
The ‘most of’ –specification is introduced to allow for there being some 
variation  in  the  actual  samples.  For  instance,  fool’s  gold  is  sometimes 
called ‘gold’, but this doesn’t make gold’s essence to involve both Au and 
iron pyrites. Also we need to specify who are the relevant speakers whose 
linguistic behaviour we take to affect a natural kind term’s reference: not 
all speakers’ use of a term affects its reference. For instance, a madman 
might constantly refer with the term ‘gold’ to nothing but television sets, 
but  this  wouldn’t  make  gold’s  essence  include  the  deep  structures  of 
television sets. There might also be some other specifications we need to 
take  into  account  in  elaborating  (DTR).  It  is  worth  noting  that  (DTR) 
doesn’t try to be a universal theory of natural kind concept reference, but 
a theory of how these concepts typically refer in lay speaker use; it allows 
that  natural  kind  concepts  can  be  introduced  differently,  especially  in 
some technical contexts.  (Consider, for instance, the concept  UNUNSEPTIUM 
which was introduced to stand for the element with the ordinal number 
117 before the element was yet empirically discovered.)
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The  most  important  point  left  open  in  (DTR),  and  also  in  the 
formulation of externalistic essentialism (EE) above, is  what the reference  
determining  deep  structure  specifically  is.  In particular,  I  have left  it  open 
whether this deep structure coincides with the scientific or metaphysical 
essence, if any, of the samples actually referred to. I  will  return to this 
issue  in  section  (4.1).  I  will  next  examine  theories  of  reference  in 
philosophy,  which,  like  the  considerations  presented  in  this  section, 
motivate the dual theory.
3. THEORIES OF REFERENCE
3.1. Description theory
The description theory of reference was examined already, in connection 
with the definition theory of concepts. The description theory holds that 
the  reference  of  a  term  is  determined  by  a  description,  or  cluster  of 
descriptions,  associated  with  it  in  the  minds  of  the  speakers.  The 
description specifies the necessary and sufficient criteria for belonging in 
the extension of the term. For instance, the term ‘bachelor’ is associated 
with the description unmarried adult male, and the term refers to anything 
that satisfies that description; ‘water’ is associated with a description such 
as  the colourless, odourless, thirst quenching substance that falls from the skies  
and fills lakes and oceans (and so on). Unlike the classical theory of concepts 
which was committed to conjunctive definitions, the description theory of 
reference allows the descriptions to be disjunctive.
3.1.1. Plato’s and Wittgenstein’s problems
The description theory faces problems both generally and especially in the 
case  of  natural  kind  terms.  The  definition  theory  of  concepts  was 
undermined by Plato’s and Wittgenstein’s problems, which were that very 
few terms can be given necessary and sufficient application conditions. 
The description theory can, however, hold that the reference determining 
descriptions  are  disjunctive,  or  that  reference  is  determined  not  by  a 
single  description,  but  rather  by  clusters  of  descriptions.  Such 
descriptions could (in principle) be complex enough to capture categories 
such  as  JUSTICE or  GAME,  which  are  impossible  to  capture  in  conjunctive 
definitions. So, Plato’s and Wittgenstein’s problems don’t undermine the 
modern description theories of reference as they do the definition theory, 
or at least not as directly.
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3.1.2. Ignorance and error problems and the descriptivist’s solutions
The  most  serious  problems for  the  description  theory  are,  once  again, 
those of  ignorance and error.  These problems pertain to proper names 
and natural kind terms, but I will here focus solely on natural kind terms. 
For instance, before the molecular structure of water was discovered, the 
descriptive  content  associated  with  ‘water’  arguably  picked  out  any 
substance  that  appeared  watery  to  us,  including  H2O,  XYZ,  and  so  on. 
However, according to Kripke’s and the other externalists’ intuitions, the 
term still referred solely to H2O, if that was in fact the watery substance in 
our surroundings. Similarly, the descriptive content associated with the 
term ‘gold’  by scientifically  ignorant  speakers  doesn’t  pick  out  gold  in 
gaseous form, but the term still arguably refers to it even in their use, as 
gaseous gold is of the same natural kind as the samples ordinarily called 
‘gold’.
These  are  cases  of  ignorance,  but  error  scenarios  are  even  more 
pressing for the description theories, as in them even the actual extension 
of a term might turn out empty. Kripke’s example is about gold. Suppose it 
turned out that gold isn’t actually yellow, metallic, shiny, and so on, but 
green and murky; imagine that our perception of gold has been disturbed 
by some peculiarities in the atmosphere (or some neurological disease, or 
an evil demon, or what have you). Suppose also that we didn’t yet know 
about the deep structure of  gold,  but instead referred to gold  solely  in 
virtue of its perceptual properties. In this case descriptivism entails that 
the term’s  extension is empty,  as no substance whatsoever satisfies the 
description(s) associated with the term ‘gold’. However, it seems that we 
did  refer to some substance with the term ‘gold’,  namely the substance 
that  appeared  to  us  goldish—we were  just  wrong about  its  properties. 
(Kripke 1980, pp. 116 – 119.)
An obvious strategy to try to solve the ignorance and error problems 
would be to introduce scientific properties in the descriptions,  but this 
will  not  do  for  two  reasons.  First,  also  scientific  descriptions  can  be 
erroneous,  as  illustrated  in  section  2.3.2.  Secondly,  it  is  plausible  that 
speakers  can  refer  to  natural  kinds  even  in  the  case  no  one  in  their 
linguistic  community  knows  about  the  reference-determining  deep 
structures.
As to the ignorance problems, the description theorist’s best solution 
is to make natural  kind term reference dependent on the nature of the 
actual  samples.  On  the  standard  reading,  descriptivism  entails  that  a 
natural  kind  term  applies  to  whatever satisfies  the  descriptive  content 
associated with the term, but on the actualised version the term applies 
solely  to  whatever  actually  satisfies  the  description(s)  (see  e.g.  Jackson 
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1998,  pp.  205  –  206).  However,  the  actuality-operator  alone  is  not 
sufficient to guarantee that a natural kind term refers to a specific actual 
natural kind. Consider, for instance, the term ‘water’ and the pre-scientific 
description  associated  with  it,  the  colourless,  odourless,  thirst  quenching  
substance that falls from the skies and fills lakes and oceans. There are (at least) 
two kinds that actually satisfy this description, namely the natural kind 
H2O and the non-natural kind watery substance. We need to specify that a 
natural  kind  term’s  reference  is  fixed  to  the  actual  natural  kind 
instantiated by the samples that actually satisfy the description associated 
with the term. (See Article I.) This solves many of the ignorance problems: 
XYZ is not water, as it is not of the same natural kind as the actual watery 
substance; gaseous gold is indeed gold, as it is of the same natural kind as 
the actual goldish substance.
Unfortunately,  this  suggestion  doesn’t  help  in  solving  the  error 
problems.  As  Kripke  demonstrates,  gold  might  not  satisfy  any  of  the 
descriptions  we  associate  with  ‘gold’  even  in  the  actual  world.  Our 
perception of gold might be distorted and our beliefs about gold might be 
erroneous.  Yet  the  term  ‘gold’  could  still  refer  via  a  causal  chain  to 
whatever we reckon to be gold, or what appears to us goldish. There is 
probably no way for the descriptivist to escape this problem other than by 
loosening the demand that the actual samples have to in fact  satisfy  the 
descriptions  associated  with  the  term.  For  example,  the  descriptivist 
might hold that the actual gold samples  need not truly be yellow, shiny, 
and malleable, but only to be reckoned to be such. These refinements lead 
to the following, modified descriptivist account:
(D) A natural kind term t refers to the natural kind instantiated by 
(most of) the samples actually reckoned to satisfy the description(s) 
associated with t.
We may title (D) a psychologistic formulation of descriptivism. It solves the 
error problems: an object can belong in a term’s extension if it is reckoned 
to satisfy the descriptions associated with the term, even if  it does not 
truly satisfy them.
These  refinements  solve  the  most  pressing  problems  of  the 
descriptivist account, but bring along novel problems.
3.1.3. Counter-argument from experimental psychology
There are two stands the descriptivist can take with respect to how the 
descriptions  are  associated  with  terms.  Either  the  descriptions  are 
conceived of as represented in the mind, and associated with terms in the 
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minds of the speakers. Alternatively, following Frege, the descriptions can 
be  considered  as  non-mental  abstract  objects,  which  are  ‘grasped’  by 
individual speakers. The Fregean view faces serious problems in trying to 
account for what kind of entities the abstract descriptions specifically are, 
and how they can be ‘grasped’ by physical beings like us. I suspect that the 
former, psychologistic variation of descriptivism is the orthodox position 
among contemporary descriptivists (see e.g.  Reimer 2003).  This raises a 
serious  threat  to  descriptivism:  in  holding  that  speakers  associate 
descriptions with their terms, the view is committed to an empirical claim 
about  human  psychology.  And  there  are  strong  reasons  to  doubt  the 
correctness of this view.
We  saw  above  that  experimental  data  crucially  undermines  the 
classical theory of concepts, which equates concepts with definitions. The 
description theory, however, has two advantages over the classical view. 
First of all, it need not hold that reference be determined by  conjunctive 
descriptions; instead, the descriptions can be disjunctive or there can be 
clusters  of  them.  Second,  since  the  description  theory  is  primarily  a 
theory of reference, not categorisation, the experimental data concerning 
typicality effects in categorisation don’t undermine it in the same way as 
they do the classical theory. Despite these differences, the experimental 
data  arguably  undermines  also  the  description  theory,  both  as 
traditionally formulated and especially in its psychologistic variety (D).
The descriptions associated with a term are traditionally thought to 
consist  of  the  identificatory  information which  determines  the  term’s 
extension.  On the orthodox,  non-Fregean reading of  descriptivism, this 
information  is  supposed  to  be  represented  in  the  speaker’s  mind, 
associated with the referring term. The information is typically taken to 
consist of perceptual features such as, in the case of  ‘water’, the wet, thirst-
quenching, transparent liquid that flows in rivers and taps… (e.g. Wikforss 2008, 
p.  159).  But  experimental  psychology  quite  convincingly  shows  that 
identificatory  information  of  this  kind  is  not in  fact  represented  as 
descriptions of any kind, but probably as prototypes or exemplar sets. This 
problem is emphasised if we consider the psychologistic  formulation of 
descriptivism  (D).  This  view  is  committed  to  the  claim  that  speakers 
actually  categorise objects in virtue of descriptions, but this view is even 
more  directly  in  conflict  with  the  experimental  data—it  is  not 
descriptions,  but  prototypes  or  exemplars  which  determine  people’s 
categorisation judgements.
A  quite  natural  response  strategy  for  the  descriptivist  would  be  to 
claim  that  her  notion  of  description  is  an  abstract  account of  people’ 
identificatory  knowledge,  independent  of  how  the  information  is 
specifically  represented.  For  instance,  people  might  represent 
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identificatory  information  about  water  in  the  form  of  exemplars  of 
particular  instances  of  water,  but  the  represented  information  could 
nevertheless  be  described  with  the  description  the  wet,  thirst-quenching,  
transparent liquid that flows in rivers and taps… The descriptivist might hold 
that  she’s  not  making a psychological  claim about how people  actually 
represent  identificatory  information,  but  only  giving  an  abstract 
description  of  that  identificatory  information.  Unfortunately  for  the 
descriptivist,  this  strategy  doesn’t  succeed,  as  the  identificatory 
information represented in terms of prototypes or exemplars cannot be 
even adequately described in terms of descriptions, even if we allow the 
descriptions to be disjunctive.
Identificatory knowledge, if represented as prototypes or exemplars, is 
extremely hard, if not impossible, to capture in descriptions. To illustrate, 
imagine a prototype P which consists of represented features F1 – F10, each 
assigned the typicality value 1 Suppose that the similarity between P and 
an object  is  calculated according to  Tversky’s  contrast  principle  (CP in 
section 2.2), and that the threshold value for P is 1.9. Now, consider which 
kind of objects can trigger P: an object which has features from F1 to F6 but 
lacks features F7 – F10;  or  an object which has features F1 – F5 and F10 but 
lacks features F6 – F9; or an object which has features F2 – F7 but lacks F1 and 
F8 – F10; and so on. A disjunctive description of the objects that can trigger 
a prototype quickly becomes extremely complex. So, a description of the 
identificatory  knowledge  associated  with,  say,  ‘water’  as  the  wet,  thirst-
quenching, transparent liquid that flows in rivers and taps… can be counted as 
an oversimplification at best, and simply wrong at worst.
In sum, it is hard to make traditional, non-psychologistic descriptivism 
compatible  with  how  people  in  fact  recognise  objects,  or  how  the 
identificatory  information  is  represented.  Moreover,  the  account  falls 
prey  to  the  error  problems,  which  are  arguably  fatal  for  it.  The 
psychologistic variation of descriptivism (D) survives the error problems, 
but it contradicts with how people as a matter of fact categorise objects: 
people don’t actually recognise objects in virtue of descriptions, not even 
disjunctive descriptions, but, according to best of our knowledge, in virtue 
of prototypes or exemplars. So, (D) is simply false.
The descriptivist’s best solution is to refine (D) into a form where any 
commitments  to  specific  psychological  matters  are  minimised.  The 
descriptivist  could  hold  that  a  term’s  reference  is  fixed  through  some 
identificatory capacities:
(D’) A natural kind term t refers to the natural kind instantiated by 
(most  of)  the  samples  that  actually  trigger  the  identificatory 
capacity associated with t.
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(D’)  solves  the  Kripkean  problems  of  error  and  at  the  same  time  is 
compatible with experimental psychology,  as it doesn’t take a stand on 
how the identificatory capacities are realised. (A similar suggestion is put 
forward  by  the  descriptivist  Martin  Davies  (2004,  pp.  115  –  116)  who 
suggests  that  a  term’s  reference  could  be  fixed  by  some ‘sub-personal 
device’ associated with the term. He doesn’t, however, elaborate on this 
idea.)
It is a terminological matter whether (D’) is a form of descriptivism at 
all  anymore. The proposed account suggests  that a natural  kind term’s 
reference is fixed to whatever actually triggers the identificatory capacity 
associated with the term, and the triggering of the capacity is a causal 
relation. However, the account is still descriptivist in the sense that the 
speakers’  identificatory  knowledge  has  an  important  role  in  fixing  the 
reference  of  a  term,  although  the  identificatory  knowledge  cannot  be 
considered strictly as descriptions.
Even (D’)  still  has,  if  not strictly  a  defect,  at  least a  deficiency.  The 
proposed descriptivist  account relies  on the actuality  operator  to  fix  a 
term’s reference to a specific natural kind, but doesn’t explain why terms 
are actuality dependent in this way, or what makes them such.
3.1.4. Actuality operator vs. essence beliefs
The role of the actuality operator in (D’) is to guarantee a natural kind 
term’s  reference  to  a  specific  natural  kind  instead  of  any  kind  that 
happens to fit the identificatory knowledge associated with the term. As 
already noted, the actuality operator alone is not, however, sufficient to 
guarantee  reference  to  a  specific  natural kind,  as  the  samples  actually 
referred  to  by  a  natural  kind  term  instantiate  at  least  two  kinds—for 
example, the samples referred to as ‘water’ instantiate the natural kind 
water (H2O) and the non-natural kind watery substance. The most obvious 
way to guarantee a natural kind term’s reference to a specific natural kind 
is simply to stipulate, as in (D’), that the term refers to a natural kind. But 
what makes the term refer thus? The problem is emphasised if we consider 
scientifically  ignorant  speakers,  who  may  not  possess  the  concept  of 
natural kind—do they still manage to refer to natural kinds?
It is plausible to suppose that natural kind terms refer to kinds with a 
certain  actual  deep  structure  because  of  speaker  intentions  or  beliefs. 
These intentions  or  beliefs  cause it  that  some terms are  used  actuality 
dependently—we could have used natural kind terms irrespectively of what 
turns out to be the deep structure of the samples actually referred to. For 
example, we might categorise an instance of XYZ as water and not change 
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our judgement even upon learning that the sample is different in deep 
structure from actual water. In this case natural kind terms (or at least 
terms with an appearance similar to our natural kind terms) would refer 
like nominal kind terms, such as ‘chair’. Even if all chairs turned out to 
share some molecular  structure X,  we wouldn’t  care  about  this  fact  in 
categorising objects as chairs—an object lacking X but satisfying all  the 
hallmarks of chairs would be a chair. What are the speaker intentions or 
beliefs that make natural kind terms refer to natural kinds?
I suggest that what makes natural kind terms actuality dependent are 
the speakers’ placeholder essence beliefs: people believe natural category 
members to share some hidden, empirically discoverable deep structure, 
whose possession they take to be necessary and sufficient for belonging in 
the  category.  We have  ended  up  in  a  dual  theory  just  like  (DTR):  the 
reference of a natural kind term is fixed to (the objects possessing) the 
deep  structure  shared  by  the  samples  that  actually   trigger  the 
identification procedure associated with the term. 
3.2. Causal theories of reference
We  already  dealt  with  Fodor’s  informational  semantics,  which  can  be 
considered a causal theory of reference, though, coupled with conceptual 
atomism, it serves also as a theory of concepts. In this section I will focus 
on the causal theories originally due to Kripke and Putnam.
Both Kripke’s and Putnam’s formulations of the causal theory are quite 
sketchy.  Kripke suggests,  rather metaphorically,  that the reference of  a 
natural kind term is fixed in a ‘baptism’. For instance, Kripke suggests, the 
term ‘gold’ might have been introduced by pointing to a set of samples 
ordinarily  called  gold  and  stipulating  that  ‘[g]old  is  the  substance 
instantiated by the items over there, or at any rate, by almost all of them’ 
(1980, p. 135). Ever since this ostensive ‘definition’, the term ‘gold’ applies 
solely  to  the  substance  instantiated  by  the  samples.  While  Kripke’s 
suggestion is only metaphorical, Putnam’s proposal is more realistic. He 
suggests that natural kind term reference is fixed through ordinary use of 
the term. For instance,  the reference of  the term ‘gold’  is  fixed to  the 
substance instantiated by the samples the term is ordinarily used to refer 
to.
I will examine the problems of the causal theories only briefly here, 
but they are investigated in more detail  in Article I. The most pressing 
problems of  the causal theories  are the so-called  qua-  and composition 
problems (see e.g. Brown 1998).
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3.2.1. The qua- and composition problems
On the causal theories, the reference of a natural kind term is fixed to the 
kind instantiated by the samples called by that term. The  qua- problems 
stem from the fact that the samples called by a term typically instantiate 
many kinds—for  instance,  the  samples  called  ‘gold’  instantiate  (among 
many others) the kinds valuable substance, shiny substance, element, Au, and 
the isotope 197Au, and the problem is to specify why the reference of ‘gold’ 
is  fixed  solely  to  Au.  (Brown  1998;  Devitt  and  Sterelny  1999.)  The 
composition  problem  is  that  the  samples  used  in  reference  fixing  are 
typically  impure,  and  the  causal  theorist  needs  to  explain  why  the 
reference of a natural kind term is fixed just to the pure substance. For 
example,  the  samples  actually  called  ‘water’  typically  contain  salts, 
minerals, chlorine, and other impurities, but still we take the term ‘water’ 
to refer solely to H2O, not to some disjunctive kind H2O plus salt x or mineral  
y or chlorine or…. (Brown 1998.) 
These problems can be taken to indicate that purely causal relations 
alone aren’t sufficient to determine the reference of a natural kind term, 
and  that  we  have  to  allow  for  some,  at  least  minimal,  descriptive 
specification of the referent as well. We need to specify that a natural kind 
term doesn’t refer to  any of the kinds actually called by the term, but to 
some specific kind. For example, we need to specify that the term ‘water’ 
refers solely to the natural kind that appears watery to us, instead of any 
compound,  solvent,  or  liquid  that  the  samples  called  ‘water’  actually 
instantiate  in  addition  to  H2O.  Michael  Devitt  and  Kim Sterelny  (1999) 
suggest that this be done by some descriptive content associated with the 
term  (for  a  more  elaborate  suggestion  of  this  kind,  see  Stanford  and 
Kitcher 2000). However, I have argued (Article I) that these suggestions, 
call  them  causal-description  hybrid  theories,  fall  prey  to  the  error 
problems that undermined the description theory: it might turn out that, 
say, water is not in fact watery, but its appearance is distorted somehow. 
These problems are solved, as in the case of the description theory, by 
relying on some identificatory capacities associated with the terms. Jessica 
Brown (1998) puts forward a suggestion like this and holds that a natural 
kind term’s reference is fixed to the natural kind that actually triggers the 
recognitional capacity  associated with the term. For instance, ‘water’ does 
not refer to any compound or liquid, since not any compound or liquid 
triggers the recognitional  capacity for water, but only H2O does. Again, 
water does not refer to the impurities of the actual water samples, since 
they are not causally responsible for (most of) the perceptual properties in 
virtue of which we recognise water: even if water lacked the impurities, it 
would still appear watery and trigger the recognitional capacity. We may 
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reasonably suppose that this ‘recognitional capacity’ is identical with the 
identification procedure of the concept associated with the term. 
Refining  the  causal  theories  leads,  thus,  to  an  account  that  is 
practically  identical  with  the  refined  description  theory  (D’):  a  natural 
kind  term’s  reference  is  fixed  to  whatever  actually  triggers  the 
identification procedure associated with the term.
3.2.2. Indexicality
Kripke suggests that the reference of a term is fixed in an initial causal 
baptism to a specific natural kind in our actual  surroundings.  Likewise, 
Putnam suggests that the reference of a natural kind term is fixed through 
being  constantly  applied  to  some  instances  of  a  natural  kind  in  the 
speakers’  surroundings.  Here  we  may ask,  just  like  in  the  case  of  the 
description theory and the actuality-operator, why are natural kind terms 
actuality  dependent,  or  what  makes  them  such?  We  could  have  used 
natural kind terms just like we use nominal kind terms, irrespectively of 
the deep structures of the actual samples—so why do we use natural kind 
terms like we do? The answer is, once again, externalistic essentialism: we 
believe  natural  kind  members  to  share  some  hidden,  empirically 
discoverable deep structure, and take the terms to refer in virtue of this 
deep structure even when it is not known. Natural kind term reference is 
not  determined causally  by coincidence—we ourselves  make them refer 
causally, or in virtue of the unknown deep structure of the actual samples. 
This leads us to an account just like the dual theory (DTR): the reference of 
a  natural  kind  term  is  fixed  to  whatever  shares  some  relevant  deep 
structure  with  the  samples  that  actually  trigger  the  identification 
procedure of the concept associated with the term.
In this section I have argued that refining both the description and causal 
theories  of  reference leads to a dual theory like (DTR). The description 
theory  falls  prey  to  the  problems  of  ignorance  and  error,  and  it  also 
conflicts with experimental psychology. To solve these problems, it has to 
be refined into the form (D’). This still leaves the problem of accounting 
for why natural kind terms are actuality dependent, or why they refer in 
virtue of some unknown deep structure of the actual samples. The obvious 
answer  is  that  we  ourselves  make  them  refer  thus;  we  intend  to  use 
natural kind terms to refer in virtue of some unknown deep structure. On 
the other hand, the causal theories of reference fall prey to the qua- and 
composition problems, which necessitate introducing some identificatory 
capacities  on  the  account.  However,  as  on  the  description  theory,  one 
matter is left unexplained on the causal theory: why do natural kind terms 
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refer just to some actual natural kind instantiated by the samples called by 
the term? The answer is externalistic essentialism, which implies that we 
ourselves intend to use natural kind terms refer causally. Thus, refining 
both the description and causal theories leads to a dual theory like (DTR).
4. GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this section I will briefly examine some consequences and applications 
of the proposed dual theory (DTR). I don’t intend to provide an extensive 
discussion of the issues here, but rather, point towards future refinements 
and applications of the theory.
4.1. Real versus believed essences
The  proposed  dual  theory  (DTR)  is  in  most  respects  equivalent  to  the 
refined versions  of  the description and causal  theory,  but there is  one 
important difference between the accounts. 
The dual theory holds that a natural kind concept has an externalistic 
essentialist  core  which  determines  its  reference  as  a  function  of  what 
actually triggers  the concept’s identification procedure. The essentialist 
core  consists  of  a  belief  in  some  ‘substance,  power,  quality,  process, 
relationship,  or  entity  that  causes  other  category-typical  properties  to 
emerge and be sustained, and that confers identity’ (Gelman 2003, p. 405). 
What  specifically  is  this  deep  structure?  Clearly  it  is  some empirically 
discoverable structure or entity, but psychological essentialism leaves it 
open  whether  it  has  to  coincide  with  the  category’s  essence  in  the 
metaphysical or scientific sense. Externalistic essentialism does hold that the 
essence  has  to  be  some deep  structure  in  fact possessed  by  the  actual 
samples,  but  it  doesn’t  have  to  be  essential  in  the  strict  scientific  or 
metaphysical  sense.  The  essentialists  are  keen  to  emphasise  that 
psychological  essentialism  isn’t  committed  to  any  metaphysical claims 
about  essences,  but  that  the  view  is  strictly  a  doctrine  about  people’s 
essentialist beliefs (e.g. Gelman 2004, p. 405; Gelman & Wellman 1991). The 
traditional  externalistic  theories  of  reference,  on  the  other  hand, 
explicitly hold that the reference of a term is fixed to the specific natural 
kind (if any) instantiated by the samples the term is actually used to refer 
to. (I am supposing here that if a kind is natural, then its members share 
some scientific essence, such as H2O in the case of water or Au in the case 
of gold.)
This is  a  subtle but important  difference: psychological  essentialism 
entails that speakers can use a natural kind term in virtue of some deep 
structure X of the samples referred to even if X cannot strictly speaking be 
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considered as an essence. An important domain where this difference has 
substantial consequences is biological species, which probably don’t have 
essences in the strict sense at all (see e.g. Hull 1965; Ereshefsky 2007). But 
irrespectively  of  the  philosophical  controversies  about  essentialism 
concerning species,  various studies  have demonstrated that people still 
use species terms essentialistically, or dependently on some unobservable 
deep structure. For instance, a transformation of an animal’s appearance 
doesn’t change its category membership as long as its lineage and insides 
are kept intact, or an animal appearing to be a member of a species K may 
be categorised as a non-K if its insides are discovered to differ from that of 
the other K-members’, and so on (Keil 1989). It doesn’t matter at all even if 
the deep features determining people’s categorisation judgements cannot 
be considered as the animal’s essence in the strict,  metaphysical sense: 
people still take membership in biological species to be determined not 
solely by perceptual features, but also by some hidden deep features.
This difference gives externalistic essentialism and (DTR) an advantage 
over  the  traditional  theories.  The  traditional  theories  hold  that  if  the 
actual  samples  don’t  instantiate  some  natural  kind,  the  term  either 
doesn’t refer at all, or it is not a natural kind term. The former option is 
clearly unacceptable—say, the term ‘cat’ refers to cats even if cats weren’t 
strictly a natural kind. What about the latter alternative? This would be to 
claim that species terms function like nominal kind terms, which apply to 
anything that satisfies the identificatory knowledge associated with the 
term.  But  this  clearly  is  not  the  case:  biological  species  terms  apply 
similarly  as  any  other  natural  kind  terms,  namely  (at  least  partly) 
externalistically. For instance, even if no one in our linguistic community 
could distinguish cats from cleverly constructed robot cats, the term ‘cat’ 
would arguably still refer solely to cats, not robots (supposing that all the 
actual  cats  are  in  fact  mammals).  In  other  words,  the  reference  of 
biological  species  terms  is  not  determined  solely  by  the  identificatory 
information associated with them, but also by some external facts about 
the actual samples’ deep structures. The traditional accounts have trouble 
explaining  this  phenomenon,  whereas  psychological  essentialism  has  a 
natural explanation for it:  even if the samples referred to don’t strictly 
speaking  instantiate  a  natural  kind,  people  can  nevertheless  have 
essentialist beliefs about them and refer with the terms externalistically.
It is important to notice that externalistic essentialism doesn’t imply 
that speakers can  ignore scientific facts about the samples referred to. If 
the samples actually referred to with a term don’t share any deep features 
whatsoever, they arguably cannot be referred to externalistically—there 
simply is no deep structure in virtue of which the term could refer. The 
reference determining deep features have to be some real features of the 
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actual  samples,  externalistic  essentialism  only  leaves  some  freedom  of  
choice with  respect  to  which  of  the  properties  are  taken  to  determine 
reference. For instance, cats might actually share lineage L, genome G, or 
physical makeup M, and it is up to the speakers (possibly some experts) to 
decide  which  of  these  deep  structures  determine  the  extension  of  the 
term ‘cat’.
We may suppose that  if the actual  samples called by a term in fact 
share some real, scientific essence (like H2O in the case of water), then this 
deep  structure  is  what  determines  the  term’s  reference  also  on 
psychological  essentialism.  To  repeat,  psychological  essentialism  holds 
that people believe natural category members to share some ‘substance, 
power, quality, process, relationship, or entity that causes other category-
typical properties to emerge and be sustained, and that confers identity’ 
(Gelman 2003,  p.  405).  If  the actual  category  members do in fact share 
some deep structure of this kind, whatever that is, then it determines the 
category’s  boundaries even according to psychological  essentialism. For 
instance, water’s typical properties are, as a matter of fact, caused by its 
consisting  of  two hydrogen  and  one  oxygen  atoms.  If  a  speaker  knew 
about  this  (and  had  sufficient  cognitive  conditions  and  scientific 
competence),  then  she  should  most  naturally  consider  being  H2O  as 
water’s essence. (In practice, of course, lay speakers often don’t have an 
opinion  about  what  the  category  essences  are,  as  that  is  beyond their 
scientific competence, but they may defer to experts; c.f. Putnam 1975.)
Is  it  possible  that  a  speaker  takes  the  essence  of  a  category  to  be 
something  other  than  it  really  is?  In  other  words,  does  the  proposed 
variety of psychological essentialism fall prey to a variety of the ignorance 
and error problem? As suggested above, it is plausible that if the category 
in fact possesses some scientific essence, then the speakers will endorse 
that  as  the  category  essence,  but  at  least  in  principle  a  speaker  could 
endorse some other deep structure as the category essence. For example, 
suppose  that,  while  the  scientific  essence  of  water  is  H2O,  a  speaker 
believes  it  to  be  the  property  of  containing  hydrogen.  Doesn’t 
psychological  essentialism  imply  that  in  this  case  the  speaker  refers, 
incorrectly, to any substance containing hydrogen with her term ‘water’, 
instead of just water (that is, H2O)? In order  to see whether the speaker 
truly refers to any substance containing hydrogen with her term ‘water’, 
we have to make sure that her decision is  considered.  First,  we have to 
make sure she understands that containing hydrogen doesn’t alone cause 
the typical features of water, but that it is being H2O that does so. Second, 
we  have  to  make  sure  that  the  speaker  is  sufficiently  intelligent  to 
understand relevant facts about atoms and molecules, and how they cause 
perceptual  properties.  Possibly  the  speaker  would also  need  to  consult 
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scientists about the subject matter. If the speaker met these requirements 
and still held that the essence of water is simply to contain hydrogen, then 
we’d have to  conclude that  she indeed refers  with her  term ‘water’  to 
anything containing hydrogen. This is not a case of ignorance and error, 
but only of non-conventional use of the term ‘water’.
So, in case the actual samples referred to with a term do possess some 
scientific essence, psychological essentialism implies that (typically) the 
term refers in virtue of that deep structure. But what about cases when 
the actual samples don’t strictly speaking share a scientific essence, like 
biological species? In this case I’m prepared to maintain that the reference 
of  the  category  term  is  (at  least  partly)  underdetermined:  there  is  no 
mind-independent  deep  structure  that  could  be  unambiguously 
considered as the essence of the category. However, it is still possible that 
in  the  course  of  scientific  progress  we  decide to  define  the  category 
essence as some specific deep structure, in which case the category term 
obtains a definite  extension.  (A suggestion of this kind is developed by 
Joseph LaPorte (2004).)
4.2. Non-natural kind concepts
Thus far I have mostly been concerned with natural kind concepts, but 
what about the vast range of  other concepts—does some variety of  the 
dual theory encompass them? More specifically, do other terms besides 
natural  kind  terms  have  semantic  cores  and  distinct  identification 
procedures, and how are the cores, if any, structured?
4.2.1. Well-defined technical concepts
Arguably  at  least  some  mathematical,  logical,  or  other  such  technical 
concepts may have definite cores. For example, the geometrical concept 
SQUARE can  be  defined  as  a  rectangle  which  has  four  right  angles  and 
parallel sides (in Euclidean geometry); the mathematical concept  RATIONAL 
NUMBER can be defined as a number which can be expressed as a ratio of two 
integers; the logical concept NEGATION can be defined as not; and so on. Some 
experimental findings suggest that even well-defined concepts like these 
may have separate identification procedures. Sharon Armstrong and Lila 
and Henry Gleitman (1983) found typicality effects concerning what they 
take  to  be  well-defined  categories,  namely  EVEN NUMBER,  ODD NUMBER,  PLANE 
GEOMETRY FIGURE,  and  FEMALE (the last category may not be considered well-
defined,  but  let’s  ignore that).  For  instance,  subjects  tend to  judge  the 
number  4  more  typical  as  an  even  number  than  106,  or  square  more 
typical  as  a  plane  geometry  figure  than  ellipse  (p.  276,  table  1). 
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Accordingly,  subjects  categorise  the  more  typical  samples  in  their 
corresponding categories more quickly than the less typical samples (p. 
286,  table  4).  These findings  clearly  don’t  show that  concepts  like  EVEN 
NUMBER or PLANE GEOMETRY FIGURE are prototypes, but they can be interpreted as 
showing  that  even  these  concepts  have  prototype-structured 
identification  procedures;  the  semantically  constitutive  core  is  still 
definitely  definable.  (Granted,  lay  speakers  don’t  often  know the 
definitions of mathematical concepts, in which case the concept cores are 
arguably  determined  by  the  experts  on  the  field;  c.f.  Putnam’s  (1975) 
suggestion about the division of linguistic labour.)
The identification  procedures of  well-defined concepts,  if  they have 
any, are semantically totally irrelevant. For instance, that the number 4 is 
judged  more  typical  as  an even number  than  106 doesn’t  mean that  4 
would have a higher degree of membership in the category  EVEN NUMBER—
numbers are even if and only if they are dividable by two, and  any  such 
number is just as much an even number as any other. A variety of the 
description or definition theory might well be viable as an account of the 
cores  of  well-defined  concepts,  while  their  identification  procedures 
might best be modelled on the prototype or exemplar account.
4.2.2. Artefact concepts
Some  recent  experimental  studies  indicate  that  artefact  concepts are 
essentialistically structured (see e.g. Bloom 1996; Kelemen 1999; Kelemen 
&  Carey  2007;  but  see  also  Sloman  and  Malt  2003).  The  essence  of  an 
artefact is  suggested  to be the artefact’s  intended function—for instance, 
chairs are intended to be used for sitting,  doors for shutting doorways, 
lamps for giving light, and so on. Crucially, these features are supposed to 
override  the  category  members’  typical  perceptual  features  in 
determining  category  membership.  For  example,  a  modern,  abstractly 
shaped  chair  is  a  chair  because  of  its  intended  chair-function  even  if 
nobody (except for its manufacturer) would recognise it as one. An object 
may  even  lack  the  typical  function of  an  artefact  category  if  it  is 
nevertheless  intended  for  that  function:  the  modern  chair  may  be 
impossible to sit on because it is too weak or inconveniently shaped. (C.f. 
Bloom 1996, pp. 2 – 3.)
An important aspect of artefact kind essentialism is that the essence of 
a  category can be distinct from any of  the prototypical  features of  the 
category: triggering the identification procedure is neither necessary nor 
sufficient  for  belonging  in  the  extension  of  an  artefact  concept.  For 
example, an object may appear to be a chair but nevertheless not be one; 
say, it is a piece of art made of plaster. Again, an object may not appear to 
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be a chair but still  be one—it might be a peculiarly sculptured modern 
chair.  These  points  suggest  that  artefact  concepts  consist  of  distinct 
identification  procedures  and  semantic  cores  (though  see  Sloman  and 
Malt 2003).
4.2.3. Social concepts
Essentialist tendencies among lay speakers have been found also in other 
domains  besides  natural  kinds  and  artefacts,  particularly  some  social 
categories. Nick Haslam, Louis Rothschild, and Donald Ernst (2000) list as 
categories  high  in  essentialism  gender,  ethnicity,  race,  and  disability, 
among others.  Haslam’s  et al.  and others’  experimental  studies  suggest 
that people tend to conceive some social categories as natural kinds and 
think that, say, human race is determined by some hidden deep features, 
which cause the features typical of that race—contrast this with the non-
essentialist belief that race is a social construct (cf. Haslam et al. 2000, p. 
114  ff.).  However,  the  notion  of  essentialist,  semantically  constitutive 
cores might be problematic in the case of social concepts, as it is unclear 
whether categories such as ethnicity or race can be delineated in terms of 
any real deep properties such as genes. For this reason it is also unclear 
whether social concepts refer externalistically like true natural kind terms
—for  example,  could  there  be  a  person  that  would  satisfy  all  of  the 
hallmarks of being white but would nevertheless not be white in virtue of 
some unknown deep properties such as genes? Probably not. Finally, even 
if lay speakers did use social concepts essentialistically, many experts do 
not: there is an ongoing, heated debate about the naturalness of categories 
like  race  or  ethnicity.  (It  is  also  noteworthy  that  the  researchers 
themselves studying essentialism about social concepts don’t take their 
view  to  make  any  semantic  commitments,  but  the  view  is  generally 
considered  to  have  explanatory  value  mainly  in  the  study  of  social 
cognition.)
4.2.4. Philosophical concepts
We have thus far encountered three types of concept cores. First, natural 
kind concept cores consist of externalistic essence beliefs; for instance, if 
water is  actually  H2O, then the term ‘water’ refers  to all  and only H2O. 
Second,  artefact  concepts  refer  in  virtue  of  the  category  members’ 
intended  function;  for  instance,  the  term  ‘chair’  refers  to  whatever  is 
intended for sitting (or whatever chairs are actually intended to be used 
for).  Third, mathematical,  logical,  and other technical definite  concepts 
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refer  in  virtue  of  a  description  or  a  definition;  say,  a  square  is  a 
rectangular polygon with four sides.
A special case are philosophically interesting concepts, such as those of 
knowledge,  justice,  virtue,  good,  beauty,  and  so  on.  Philosophers  have 
spent millennia on trying to provide necessary and sufficient application 
conditions for these concepts, without much success. Do these concepts 
have any kind of definite cores? There are probably two alternatives with 
respect to how the cores might be structured; either they are definitions, 
as  in  the  case  of  mathematical  or  other  technical  terms,  or  they  are 
externalistic, as in natural kind concepts (it is highly improbable that, say, 
justice or  knowledge would have some intended function like  artefacts 
do). Trying to find analytic definitions for these concepts is the traditional 
way: for instance, it is suggested that knowledge is justified true belief, or 
that an act is just if and only if it maximises utility, and so on. 
The  definition  strategy  has  been  criticised  recently.  For  instance, 
William Ramsey (1992) suggests that the over two millennia long history 
of  failures  to  provide  generally  accepted  definitions  for  philosophical 
concepts  suggests  that  these  concepts  may not  have  definitions  at  all. 
Ramsey  also  draws  on  experimental  psychology  and  suggests  that 
philosophical concepts might be prototypically structured, and thus lack 
definitions. This line of thought has been replied to by claiming that even 
though  philosophical  analysis  couldn’t  ever  provide  necessary  and 
sufficient  conditions  for  the  application  of  philosophical  concepts,  the 
analysis  is  still  fruitful  and  interesting—philosophical  analysis  has 
deepened our understanding of what is (and is not) knowledge,  justice, 
virtue, and so on (see Sandin 2006). Against Ramsey it can also be noted 
that it is unclear whether philosophical concepts are indeed prototypes: 
there  are  no  experimental  studies  that  have  addressed  this  issue. 
Moreover, the long history of analysis of philosophical concepts can be 
interpreted  to  count  against  the  view  that  they  are  prototypes:  if 
philosophical concepts were indeed prototypes, it would probably be very 
uninteresting  to try to define them (try to define the prototype of chair, 
game,  bachelor,  and  so  on).  The fact  that  philosophical  concepts  have 
interested many great minds for over two millennia can be interpreted as 
showing  that  these  concepts  must  involve  some  interesting,  complex 
theoretical elements. This interpretation is not far-fetched, as the theory-
theory  might  well  encompass,  if  not  all  concepts,  at  least  a  very wide 
range of them (see Murphy & Medin 1999).
What  about  the  strategy  of  conceiving  philosophical  concepts  as 
natural kind concepts? Hilary Kornblith (e.g. 2002), following Quine (1969) 
argues  that  knowledge is  a  natural  kind,  and  that  epistemology  should 
investigate this kind itself instead of our concept of it. Kornblith compares 
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knowledge  with  aluminium:  In  trying  to  learn  about  aluminium,  it  is 
uninteresting to analyse our concept of aluminium, such as that aluminium 
is  typically  grey  and  silvery  and  used  for  building  airplanes.  What  is 
interesting is to investigate aluminium  itself—what its deep structure is, 
how it reacts with other substances, and so on. Analogously, according to 
Kornblith,  epistemologists  shouldn’t  be  analysing  our  concept  of 
knowledge, but knowledge itself.
Maybe  the  main  problem  of  naturalised  epistemology  is  that  it  is 
unclear whether knowledge is in fact a natural kind. The whole endeavour 
of naturalised epistemology rests on the presupposition that knowledge is 
a  natural  kind,  but  I  know of  no  theorist  that  would have extensively 
examined the vast literature in cognitive psychology and animal ethology 
to find out  what kind of a natural kind  knowledge might in fact be, if any. 
Rather, the discussion has revolved around the philosophical implications 
of  considering  knowledge  as  a  natural  kind.  Yet  many or  most  of  the 
philosophical  arguments  against  naturalised  epistemology  rest  just  on 
what kind of a natural kind knowledge is taken to be. 
The  strategy  of  conceiving  of  philosophical  terms  as  natural  kind 
terms is even less plausible in the case of concepts like  JUSTICE, VIRTUE,  or 
GOOD. The long history of failure to define philosophical concepts suggests 
that these concepts also lack definitions.  It  is  improbable that they are 
prototypes or exemplar sets either, since the long history of philosophical 
study suggests that they involve much more complex, theoretical aspects 
than  simple  prototypes  or  sets  of  exemplars  would.  An  account  of  a 
prototype or exemplar concept could be given basically in terms of a list 
of the features which are more or less typical of the category members, 
but it seems that philosophical concepts cannot be captured this easily. 
How, then, are philosophical concepts structured? If the theory-theorists 
are  correct  in  claiming that  even  artefact  concepts  involve  theoretical 
elements, it is well possible that so do philosophical concepts (note that 
this  does  not  necessarily  mean that  they  should  have definite  concept 
cores). In the face of this, the prospects of the traditional  philosophical 
study of these concepts don’t appear quite as poor as Ramsey argues. Even 
though  it  is  improbable  that  philosophers  could  ever  reach  simple 
definitions for (most) philosophical concepts, they can clarify and deepen 
our understanding of them, and bring out conceptual problems.
4.3. The dual theory and the desiderata for a theory of concepts
Thus far I’ve examined mostly how concepts refer and determine people’s 
categorisation judgements, but concepts are supposed to have many other 
tasks  in  addition  to  these  two.  The presented  dual  theory  is  mainly  a 
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theory of reference, but it also takes a stand on how natural kind concepts 
are generally structured. Thus, it cannot be evaluated simply in terms of 
how  successful  it  is  in  explaining  reference;  we  must  also  take  into 
account the other tasks of  concepts,  and the desiderata for a theory of 
concepts.
Laurence and Margolis (1999, p. 72; see also Prinz 2002, chapter I) claim 
that concepts, or a theory of concepts, should provide an explanation for 
(at least) the following phenomena:
• Fast categorisation
• Considered acts of categorisation
• Semantic application
• The licensing of inductive inference
• Analytic inference
• Concept acquisition
• Compositionality
• Stability
Let us briefly look at each of these requirements and examine how the 
proposed dual theory tackles with them. My main emphasis will again be 
on natural kind concepts, but I will also briefly touch upon other concepts. 
I  will  have to  leave  the  discussion  in  the  following sections  somewhat 
sketchy, as an extensive investigation of the topics lies outside the scope 
of this introductory essay.
4.3.1. Categorisation and reference
As  suggested  in  section  (2.5),  the  identification  procedures  typically 
involve  prototypes  or  exemplars,  which  enable  quick,  rough-and-ready 
categorisation,  but  they  can  also  include  more  theoretical  beliefs.  For 
instance, even though we typically recognise plants by their appearance, 
we  nevertheless  know  that,  despite  their  resemblance  to  the  plant 
prototype or exemplars, corals and anemones are not plants. (As already 
noted, it is important to distinguish these specific essence beliefs from the 
reference-determining,  externalistic essence  beliefs.)  Any  categorisation 
judgement  based  on  the  identification  procedure  can  go  wrong:  an 
instance of a watery substance might turn out not to share deep structure 
with  the  actual  water  samples;  or  it  might  turn  out  that  corals  and 
anemones are not animals after all.  The concept cores are the ultimate 
arbiters  of  categorisation,  and  determine  reference.  Whatever  truly  is 
water is determined by our externalistic essence belief about water, which 
makes the term apply to whatever shares some relevant deep structure 
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with the actual water samples. Accordingly,  a categorisation judgement 
based on the externalistic essence belief cannot go wrong (supposing the 
speaker meets certain requirements). Say, if I know that an instance of a 
watery  substance  shares  some relevant  deep  structure  with  the  actual 
water  samples,  and  if  I  am  sufficiently  intelligent  and  competent  in 
science, then I cannot be wrong about the sample’s being water. 
Similar considerations apply also to some non-natural concepts which 
might  have  distinct  cores  and  identification  procedures.  We  may 
recognise  grandmothers  in  virtue  of  their  having  grey  hair,  wearing 
glasses, and so on; or we may recognise chairs in virtue of their typical 
shape.  Any  categorisation  judgement  made  solely  on  the  basis  of  the 
identification procedure can, however, go wrong: an old woman with grey 
hair and glasses might turn out to have no children, or the chair-shaped 
object might turn out to be a piece of abstract art. The ultimate criterion 
for  being a  grandmother  is  be  female  and have grandchildren;  to  be a 
chair is to be intended for sitting; and so on.
We may distinguish between more or less defining features, and more 
or less reliable categorisation judgements, even in the case of concepts 
which  lack  strictly  distinct  cores  and  identification  procedures.  For 
instance, right acts  may have certain salient properties in virtue of which 
we  can  easily  and  quickly  recognise  them.  However,  such  quick 
categorisation judgements may go wrong,  as upon further investigation 
and reflection we may find out that a particular act was not in the end 
right. For instance, we may make a prima facie judgement that the killing 
of a murderer is right,  but upon reflecting on our moral intuitions and 
relevant contingent matters of fact, we may end up concluding that the 
earlier judgement was wrong and that the killing is after all wrong. This 
might be so even if there eventually is no definite matter of fact whether 
the deed is really right or wrong.
4.3.2. Inductive and analytic inference
What  about  the  licensing  of  inductive  and  analytic  inference?  Quite 
clearly,  it  is  the task of  the identification  procedures to  determine the 
former,  and  the  task  of  concept  cores  to  determine  the  latter.  For 
instance,  we  can  inductively  infer  on  the  basis  of  our  prototypical 
representation  of  water  that  water  is  typically  odourless,  colourless, 
thirst-quenching,  wet,  flows  in  rivers  and fills  lakes,  and so  on.  These 
inferences  aren’t,  however,  analytic  or  conceptual:  it  is  not  logically 
necessary that water possess any of these features. The only analytic truth 
about  water  is  determined  by  the  semantic  core  of  the  concept  WATER: 
necessarily, any sample of water possesses the relevant deep structure (if 
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any) shared by the actual samples called ‘water’. This is a necessary truth 
about water, as the reference of the term ‘water’ is ultimately determined 
by the actual samples’ deep structure. It is also an  a priori  truth, that is, 
knowable  through  reflection:  the  reference-determining  placeholder 
essence beliefs constitute concepts, which are mental representations and 
in principle accessible through reflection. Similar considerations hold for 
other concepts: we may inductively infer of grandmothers, on the basis of 
the concept’s identification procedure, that they are typically grey-haired 
and wear glasses; similarly that chairs typically possess legs, a seat, and a 
backrest.  However,  grandmothers  aren’t  necessarily  grey-haired,  and 
chairs  don’t  necessarily  have  legs,  a  seat,  and  a  backrest  (consider  a 
beanbag chair). Analytic inferences are driven by the core: it is analytic 
and necessary that grandmothers have grandchildren, and that chairs are 
intended for sitting.
The  division  between the  analytic  and  synthetic  may be  somewhat 
fuzzy in the case of some concepts, which can be taken to indicate that the 
cores  and  identification  procedures  of  these  concepts  aren’t  strictly 
separate. For instance, it is not clear whether it is an analytic truth about 
bachelors that they are unmarried adult males: say, the pope seems not to 
be a bachelor although he satisfies these criteria. Again, some concepts 
arguably  lack  cores  altogether,  and  thus  don’t  entitle  strictly  analytic 
inferences  at  all.  Such  concepts  might  include  social  or  philosophical 
concepts  such as  RIGHT,  JUSTICE,  GOOD,  and so on,  which have proven to be 
extremely difficult to provide any definitions for. For instance, an act that 
produces the greatest overall utility is typically right, but sometimes not 
(as in the case of killing of a scapegoat);  good intentions typically elicit 
good acts, but sometimes not; and so on.
The  proposed  account  of  analyticity  makes  minimal  metaphysical 
commitments; in particular, it isn’t committed to there being any mind-
independent,  abstract analyticities.  On my account,  a  truth involving a 
concept  C  is  analytic  just  in  case  it  is  true  in  virtue  of  the  reference-
determining conditions represented in the concept C. Since this account 
of analyticity does not rely on notions such as synonymy, but instead is 
purely  naturalistic,  there  are  chances  that  it  escapes  the  Quinean 
problems of analyticity.
4.3.3. Concept acquisition
The  desideratum  that  concepts  should  be  acquirable  addresses  mainly 
Fodor’s theory of concepts, which many, including Fodor himself, take to 
entail that concepts can not be acquired, and that they are innate. This is 
roughly for the following reason. On Fodor’s account the reference of a 
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concept  is  fixed  through  dispositions  to  token  that  concept,  and 
accordingly,  a  subject  cannot  possess  a  concept  unless  she  has  some 
specific  concept  tokening  dispositions.  But  now,  a  subject  cannot  be 
disposed to token a concept unless she already possess it. Fodor’s solution 
to this problem is to hold that almost all concepts are innate, which makes 
his account deeply implausible in the eyes of many. (However, Margolis 
(1998) argues that  concepts  on Fodor’s  account  can  be learned through 
acquiring the mechanisms sustaining the concept tokening dispositions.) 
The  proposed  dual  theory  has  no  trouble  accounting  for  concept 
acquisition, as prototypes, exemplars, and essence beliefs can be acquired 
(see e.g. Margolis 1998, p. 359 ff.). This gives the proposed dual theory an 
advantage over Laurence and Margolis’ account, where the concept cores 
are atomistic and may not be learnable.
4.3.4. Compositionality
As we saw in the section concerning prototypes,  the main problems in 
accounting for compositionality pertain to vague concepts. In positing at 
least some concepts with definite cores, the dual theory can escape these 
problems.  With respect  to  these  concepts  we can endorse  the classical 
theory  of  compositionality,  where  the  first,  semantic  stage  can  be 
modelled  on classical logic  and set theory. Again, in the second stage a 
subject  forms  a  representation  of  (a  typical  member  of)  the  complex 
category, and this process may involve versatile psychological processes. 
The dual theory does not take a stand on how the second stage is realised, 
but we may reasonably suppose that this stage is not, in the end, crucial 
for  cognition:  we  can  possess  a  concept  even  if  we  are  incapable  of 
forming  a  specific  representation  of  its  typical  instances  (recall  the 
example about Boolean concepts, such as NON-CAT). 
In fact,  it  seems that whether concepts  can or cannot compose is a 
question independent of how they are structured; that is, if we consider 
purely  extensional  or  semantic  compositionality.  For  instance,  the 
concept  NON-CAT applies to whatever does not belong in the extension of 
CAT,  and  it  is  another  question  what  determines what  belongs  in  the 
extension of  CAT—whether it is  prototypes, essence beliefs,  or whatever. 
Similarly for other complex concepts, such as MONSTER BANANA, PET FISH, and so 
on. The constituent concepts determine what belongs in their respective 
extensions,  and  the  remaining  theoretical  work  is  done  purely  on  the 
logical  or  semantic  level:  an  object  belongs  in  the  extension  of  the 
complex  concept  MONSTER BANANA if  and  only  if  it  belongs  both  in  the 
extension of MONSTER and BANANA, and so on. Thus conceived, the problem of 
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compositionality (if  there is such) is  independent of specific theories of 
concepts.
4.3.5. Stability or concept sharing
By  stability  it  is  meant  that  concepts  should  be  shareable  between 
different  individuals,  or  by  a  single  individual  at  different  times.  The 
traditional theories of concepts which identify concepts with some set of 
identifying  knowledge  have  trouble  accounting  for  stability,  as  the 
identificatory  knowledge  can  vary  between  individuals,  or  within  an 
individual at different times. For instance, a speaker may be ignorant of 
the deep structure of gold and believe that gold is a compound, whereas 
another  speaker  may  believe  (correctly)  that  gold  is  an  element.  The 
traditional  theories  entail  that  these  two speakers  don’t  strictly  share 
concepts,  but nevertheless  it  very much seems that  they aren’t  talking 
past  each  other:  they  are  talking  about  the  same substance,  gold,  and 
disagreeing about its deep structure. Again, a single speaker may change 
her beliefs about gold—say, the ignorant speaker can learn that gold is not 
in fact a compound, but an element. In this case it seems that she learns 
something about gold,  not  that  the meaning (that  is,  reference)  of  her 
concept  GOLD changes.  If  the concept  GOLD had indeed changed meaning, 
then the speaker couldn’t have been wrong about the deep structure of 
gold, since then she would have failed to refer to gold.
The  dual  theory  accounts  for  stability  readily,  as  it  holds  that  any 
specific  identificatory  knowledge  is  not  semantically  constitutive  for  a 
natural kind concept. Instead, the reference of a natural kind concept is 
determined as  a  function  of  external  facts  by the externalistic  essence 
belief. Accordingly, in order to share concepts, two speakers only need to 
share the externalistic essence belief. For example, if both the speakers 
disagreeing  about  the  deep  structure  of  gold  believe  that  the  ultimate 
criterion of being gold is to share some relevant deep structure with the 
actual gold samples, they manage to co-refer.
The case with biological species terms is somewhat different since, as 
noted in section (4.1), the reference of these concepts may not be totally 
pre-determined. This is because biological species members may not share 
any single empirically discoverable deep essence at all, but rather there 
are a range of  properties  that could be identified as the essence of the 
category. As LaPorte (2004) notes, essences of such categories may not be 
strictly discovered, but at least partly defined. It is, then, possible that along 
different theories of the essence of biological species, the meanings of the 
category  terms do in  fact  change  (as  Ghiselin  1987 argues).  This  point 
about failure of concept sharing and stability may, however, apply mostly 
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to  experts,  who  may  be  committed  to  specific  views  about  species 
essences. Lay speakers need not do so, and can share species concepts. As 
in the case of other natural kind concepts, they can even have diverging 
beliefs about the species members as long as they share the placeholder 
belief  that  the  species  members  still  share  some deep  structure  which 
determines  the  category  boundaries.  (Note  that  concept sharing is  not 
precluded  even if species members don’t share an essence in the strict 
sense—concept  sharing  is  enabled  by  the  belief that  there  is  some 
reference-determining  deep  structure.)  For  example,  one  speaker  may 
believe that tigers are spotted and red, another that they are tawny and 
striped,  but  they  still  manage  to  co-refer  in  virtue  of  the  essentialist 
intention  to  refer  with  the  term  ‘tiger’  to  creatures  that  share  some 
relevant deep structure with the animals actually called ‘tigers’.
The  dual  theory  can  salvage  stability  also  in  the  case  of  artefact 
concepts, unlike some previous theories. For instance, a description or a 
prototype theory might identify the concept CHAIR with a set of perceptual 
features  of  chairs,  thus  entailing  that  two  speakers  having  different 
perceptual  representations of  chairs  fail  to share the concept  CHAIR.  But 
this  is  counterintuitive.  It is  possible that one of  the speakers has only 
met, say, office chairs during her life, while the other has only met bean 
bag chairs, but arguably they both mean the same thing by their concept 
CHAIR—given the opportunity, they would easily learn that there are other 
kinds of chairs than just office and beanbag chairs. The dual theory can 
easily account for this fact.  It entails that the extension of the concept 
CHAIR is  determined by the essence belief  about chairs,  and most of  the 
perceptual  representations  of  chairs  are  irrelevant  for  the  concept’s 
reference. Thus, if the two speakers both believe that chairs are artefacts 
intended for sitting,  they manage to co-refer  and share the concept.  If 
they  knew that  both  the  bean  bags  and  office  chairs  are  intended  for 
sitting, they’d agree in their judgements about their chairhood.
In the case of concepts which lack cores altogether we may have to 
allow for some extent of instability. For example, if one speaker believes 
that punishing a scapegoat is just and another that it is unjust, and neither 
would  change  her  opinion  upon  reflection  and  discussion,  then  there 
seems to be no alternative but to grant that they mean slightly different 
things by their concepts of justice.
4.4. Philosophical applications: rigid predicates
Natural kind terms have had, at least since Kripke, a special position in the 
philosophy of language. Kripke suggests that natural kind terms are, like 
proper names, rigid designators. Rigidity is easily defined for proper names 
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and other singular terms, but not so for kind terms. Let’s start with the 
former.
Kripke’s suggestion about rigidity is best understood in opposition to 
description theories of reference. A description theory about the proper 
name ‘Aristotle’  might hold that the name’s reference is determined by 
the description the last great philosopher of antiquity. Kripke argues that this 
description cannot, however, determine the name’s reference, as it might 
pick out different objects in different possible worlds: in some alternative 
worlds  Aristotle  died  in  infancy,  in  some  others  he  never  became 
interested  in  philosophy.  Kripke  suggests  that  proper  names  are  rigid 
designators and refer to the same individual as they actually do in every 
possible world (in which that individual exists), and nothing else:
(STR) If a singular  term  t refers to object x in a world w, then  t 
refers to x in every possible worlds where x exists, and  t  doesn’t 
refer to any other object in any possible world.
Thus,  the name ‘Aristotle’  refers  to  the  same actual  individual  even in 
possible worlds where he doesn’t satisfy the descriptions associated with 
the term. 
Arguably the most important theoretical consequence of proper name 
rigidity  is that identity  statements involving two actually co-referential 
rigid  designators  come out  necessarily  true.  For  instance,  consider  the 
following statement:
(1) Hesperus is Phosphorus.
If the terms ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ both actually refer to the planet 
Venus, then by (STR), the statement (1) is necessarily true: the two terms 
name the  same object  in  every possible  world.  Crucially,  despite  being 
necessarily true, (1) is  a posteriori: it was a remarkable empirical finding 
that Hesperus and Phosphorus are in fact one and the same planet.
Kripke  suggests  that  natural  kind  terms  are  rigid  just  like  proper 
names, and that rigidity makes certain identity statements between co-
referring natural kind terms necessary. For instance, rigidity should make 
statements like ‘water is H2O’, ‘tigers are feline mammals’, or ‘gold is the 
element with the atomic number 79’, necessary if actually true. However, 
thus  far  no  one  has  come  up  with  a  generally  accepted  definition  of 
rigidity;  all proposals face serious problems (see Schwartz 2002; Soames 
2003).  Stephen  Schwartz  (2002)  has  even  suggested  that  we  reject  the 
notion of rigidity for kind terms or predicates altogether. I will not go into 
examining the proposed accounts of  rigidity  here.  Instead,  I  will  argue 
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that  rigidity  need  not  have  any  role  whatsoever  in  explaining  the 
necessity of statements of the above kind, but rather that their necessity 
is  explained  by  the  essence  beliefs  of  the  corresponding  concepts.  (A 
precautionary note:  it is important not to confuse the present proposal 
with  Michael  Devitt’s  (2005)  ‘essentialist  view’  about  rigid  predicates, 
according to which a predicate is rigid if and only if it applies to an object 
necessarily, if at all.)
Identity statements versus essence statements
Possibly the most important theoretical task of the notion of rigidity for 
natural  kind terms is to  explain why identification sentences involving 
two co-referring natural kind terms are necessary. This is supposed to be 
done in somewhat the same manner as in the case of singular terms: just 
like  the sentence ‘Hesperus is  Phosphorus’  is  necessary if  actually  true 
solely  in  virtue  of  the  rigidity  of  the  terms  in  it,  we’d  expect  that  so  is  a 
statement  like  ‘water  is  H2O’  (see  Kripke  1980,  e.g.  p.  143).  There  are, 
however, some important differences between the two statement types, 
which give us reasons to doubt the reasonableness of this endeavour.
Let us consider more closely the following two statements:
(1) Hesperus is Phosporus.
(2) Water is H2O.
The most important discrepancy between (1) and (2) is that the former is 
an identity  statement  between two individuals,  whereas  the  latter  is  a 
predicative statement, attributing water a certain scientific property (see 
e.g. LaPorte 2004, p. 36 ff.). This is easier to notice if we reformulate (2) as 
follows:
(2’) Water consists of two hydrogen and one oxygen atoms.
Quite clearly, (2’) and (1) are not analogous, and thus, we need not suppose 
that  their  identity  be  explained  in  the  same  way.  This  point  is 
strengthened by the fact that the logical form of predicative statements 
concerning the deep structures of natural kinds are different from that of 
identity  statements  between singular  terms.  Whereas  (1)  can be  easily 
formulated as a proper identity statement as in (1’), (2) is best captured in 
(2’’):
(1’) Hesperus = Phosphorus.
(2’’) (x)(water(x)  H ↔ 2O(x))
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(On this point, see also Soames 2003, p. 430 ff.) Moreover, even if (2) could 
somehow be formulated  as  an identity,  many other  similar  statements 
which also should come out necessary if actually true cannot. Consider, 
for  instance,  the  statement  ‘cats  are  animals’,  which,  if  actually  true, 
should come out necessarily true on the basis of rigidity (c.f. Kripke 1980, 
p.  125 – 126).  This  statement clearly cannot be captured as an identity, 
since even though all cats are actually animals, not all animals are cats. 
Instead,  the form of  the statement  is  a  universally  quantified  material 
implication:
(3) (x)(cat(x)  → animal(x))
So, unlike (1), (2) and (3) cannot be called ‘identity statements’ at all—to 
separate the two, let us call the latter essence statements. Whereas rigidity 
is arguably needed to account for the necessity of identity statements like 
(1), the notion is  not needed at all in explaining the necessity of essence 
statements.  The latter’s necessity stems simply from the fact that  they 
describe the category essences; no theoretical role whatsoever is left for 
rigidity. For example, it is necessary that water is H2O because the concept 
WATER has an essentialist core that makes it apply to a sample if and only if 
it shares some relevant deep structure with the actual water samples. And 
if this deep structure is H2O, then WATER applies to a sample if and only if it 
is H2O. Thus, the statement ‘water is H2O’ comes out necessary. 
The above discrepancies hold between natural kind terms and singular 
terms, but the same discrepancies hold even within a domain of terms. For 
instance, contrast (1) with the following:
(4) Hesperus is the celestial object with constitution C and origin O.
(Example from Haukioja 2006.) Whereas the necessity of (1) is guaranteed 
solely by the actual co-reference and rigidity of the terms, (4) is clearly an 
essence statement. If the essence of a celestial object is to have a certain 
constitution and origin,  and if Hesperus actually has the constitution C 
and origin O, then it is necessary that (4) is true. The necessity of (4) is 
explained solely by the fact  that it is a description of the essence of the 
planet,  and rigidity has no role whatsoever in accounting for it.  On the 
other hand, we can find examples of identity statements also in the case of 
natural  kind  terms.  LaPorte  (2004,  p.  36)  gives  the  following  as  an 
example:
(5) Brontosaurus is Apatosaurus.
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The  terms ‘Brontosaurus’  and ‘Apatosaurus’  were originally  thought  to 
refer to distinct species of dinosaurs, but it turned out that they denoted 
just the same species. The statement (5) is analogical to (1): in both cases 
we have two terms that refer to the same object or kind. Other examples 
of  identity  statements  involving  kind  terms  include  ‘honeybee  is  Apis 
Mellifera’ (LaPorte 2000) and ‘soda is pop’ (LaPorte 2004). The necessity of 
each of these sentences is guaranteed by the fact that the terms in them 
denote the same species:  ‘Apis Mellifera’  is  just the Latin name for  the 
honeybee,  and  ‘soda’  and  ‘pop’  are  names  for  the  same beverage.  I’m 
prepared to believe that  some  notion of kind term rigidity might explain 
the necessity of identity statements like these. A plausible account is given 
by  LaPorte  (2000;  2004),  who holds  that  rigidity  for  kind terms  means 
simply that the kind term refers to (objects of) the same kind in every 
possible world. However,  no notion of kind term rigidity  whatsoever is 
needed to explain the necessity of  essence statements  like (2) and (4). And 
these are the kind of statements that Kripke and others were originally 
most interested in discussions about rigidity, not identity statements like 
‘Brontosaurus is Apatosaurus’ or ‘soda is pop’.
So, we might need some notion of kind term rigidity to account for 
identities involving kind terms, such as (5), but we don’t need rigidity to 
account for the necessity of essence statements like (2) or (3).  But why 
cannot (2) be conceived as an identity statement? After all, the terms ‘H2O’ 
and ‘water’ do co-refer, even though the former is a scientific description 
unlike  the  latter.  Moreover,  the  logical  form  of  (2)  and  the  identity 
statement (5) is the same:
(2’’) (x)(water(x)  H ↔ 2O(x))
(5’) (x)(Brontosaurus(x) ↔ Apatosaurus(x))
The answer is  that,  contrary to appearance,  (2) and (5) are not strictly 
analogical.  Whereas  (5)  is  necessarily  true  solely  in  virtue  of  the  co-
reference of the terms in it, irrespectively of what we believe to be the 
essence of Brontosaurus, the truth of (2) depends on our essence beliefs 
about water. If a speaker believes that the essence of water is not its actual 
molecular structure, but instead some set of functional properties such as 
potable,  life-supporting,  odourless,  and  colourless  (and  so  on),  then  the 
statement  (2)  is  not  necessary even  if  actually  true—in the  use  of  this 
speaker, ‘water’ could refer to something besides H2O (such as XYZ). (5), 
on the  other  hand,  is  true irrespectively  of  what we believe to  be  the 
essence of Brontosaurus. If the essence is X, then  both Brontosaurus  and 
Apatosaurus are necessarily X; if the essence is Y, then both Brontosaurus 
and  Apatosaurus are necessarily Y. In any case the essence is shared by 
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Brontosaurus and Apatosaurus,  simply  because they  are  one  and  the  same  
kind.  So, essence statements like (2) and identity statements like (5) are 
not analogical, despite their equivalent logical form.
In sum: rigidity explains the necessity of identity statements involving 
proper names, and some analogical notion of kind term rigidity (such as 
LaPorte’s)  might  explain the  necessity  of  identity  statements  involving 
kind terms. However, I distinguished from these two classes of statements 
essence statements,  whose necessity is explained by essence beliefs about 
the categories—no role is  left  for  kind term rigidity.  Thus,  the present 
proposal departs from the traditional accounts of kind term rigidity,  in 
which the necessity of essence statements is supposed to be guaranteed by 
rigidity alone.
The claim that rigidity is not needed at all to account for the necessity 
of essence statements might be contested. It could be claimed that even 
though rigidity is not alone sufficient to explain the necessity of essence 
statements, it is nevertheless necessary in explaining it. This, the argument 
would go, is because without being able to refer to the same kind in all 
possible worlds, we couldn’t say anything about a specific actual kind’s 
essential  features  in  the  first  place,  as  essential  features  can  only  be 
defined  as  features  possessed  by  the  kind  in  all  possible  worlds.  For 
instance,  without being able  to  refer  just to  water (instead of,  say,  any 
watery substance) in all possible worlds, we wouldn’t be able to conclude 
that water is essentially  H2O, as the referent of  the term ‘water’ would 
vary between different worlds.
In my opinion this is to put the cart before the horse. Whatever is the 
‘same’  kind  across  possible  worlds  is  determined  by our  essence  beliefs 
about  it.  In  other  words,  ‘water’  refers  rigidly  to  H2O  just  because  we 
believe water’s deep structure to be determined by the deep structure of 
the  actual  samples.  We  could  have  used  ‘water’  non-essentialistically, 
irrespectively of whatever turns out to be the kind’s actual deep structure. 
We  could  have taken  water’s  essence  to  be  some  set  of  functional 
properties like being life-supporting, potable, refreshing, and so on. In this 
case the term would not have referred rigidly to H2O, but to whatever is 
life-supporting, potable, refreshing, and so on. Accordingly, the statement 
‘water is H2O’ would not have been necessary even if actually true. What 
explains  the  necessity  of  the  essence statements  is  our  essence beliefs 
about the kind referred to—that the deep structure of the actual water 
samples is necessary and sufficient for being water, that being a mammal 
is part of the cat-essence, and so on. 
All  the theoretical  work concerning essence statements expected of 
natural kind term rigidity is done by the fact that natural kind concepts 
have  essentialist  cores.  Most  importantly,  this  view  makes  essence 
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statements  necessary  if  actually  true.  For  example,  (2)  is  necessary  if 
actually  true  because  we  intend  to  use  the  term  ‘water’  to  refer  to 
whatever  shares  some  relevant  deep  structure  with  the  actual  water 
samples. If that  deep structure is actually H2O, then water is  necessarily 
H2O.  This  also  explains  why  essence  statements  are  a  posteriori:  the 
reference-determining  deep  structure  is  external  and  empirically 
discoverable. In a related vein, the essentialist view bridges the so-called 
modal gap concerning a posteriori necessities. The question is how empirical 
findings about, say, water’s actual, contingent deep structure can tell us 
anything  about  the  necessary  properties  of  water.  Externalistic 
essentialism grants that the empirical finding alone does not warrant any 
modal conclusions, but it entails that it can do so in conjunction with the 
essence belief that the actual deep structure of water is necessary for it.
Rigidity is typically supposed to apply mainly to natural kind terms, 
and not to any other terms. A problem pertaining to accounts of rigidity 
thus  far  is  that  they  fail  to  meet  this  demand  by  either  under-  or 
overextending the notion of  rigidity.  For instance,  LaPorte’s  account of 
rigidity has been criticised for making such terms as ‘bachelor’ or ‘Mary’s 
favourite colour’ rigid (e.g. Schwartz 2002), whereas Devitt’s account has 
been criticised for  not  making terms such as ‘hot’, ‘loud’, and ‘red’ rigid 
(e.g. Soames 2003). The essentialist view has no trouble for accounting for 
these  cases.  Terms  like  ‘bachelor’  or  ‘Mary’s  favourite  colour’  are  not 
essentialist in that they don’t refer in virtue of any deep structure of the 
actual samples. For instance, even if all bachelors happened to share some 
genome, arguably we wouldn’t count possessing that genome as necessary 
for being a bachelor. On the other hand, terms like ‘hot’, ‘loud’, and ‘red’, 
which  should  come  out  rigid,  are  all  essentialist.  Hot  objects  are  hot 
because they have high molecular motion, loud objects are loud because 
they emit high intensity  sound waves,  and red objects  are red because 
they reflect white light on a certain wavelength (granted, in the case of 
‘red’  it  isn’t  literally  the  deep structure  of  the  actual  samples  that 
determines reference, but it is still some hidden, empirically discoverable 
essential property). 
Finally, rigidity has been considered to have a role in distinguishing 
between terms that  the description  theory  of  reference applies  to  and 
those that it does not (Devitt 2005, p. 144). Externalistic essentialism can 
make such a distinction: since essentialist terms refer in virtue of some 
external deep structure of the actual samples, any description can fail to 
pick out that deep  structure, and thus cannot determine reference. (An 
exception is, of course, if the descriptions are rigidified by stipulating that 
they apply solely to whatever actually satisfies them.)
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In  sum,  since  the  externalistic  essentialist  account  does  all  the 
theoretical work expected of kind term rigidity, I suggest that we follow 
Schwartz’s (2002) recommendation and don’t extend the notion of rigidity 
to kind terms at all. Another option would be to define kind term rigidity 
in  terms  of  externalistic  essentialism,  but  this  may not  be  reasonable, 
since the notion would not be analogous with the notion of singular term 
rigidity.
5. CONCLUSIONS
At the outset I argued that concepts determine not only categorisation but 
also reference; thus, a complete theory of concepts should  explain both 
categorisation  and  reference.  I  have  argued  that  none  of  the  present 
theories of concepts succeed in this task, as each of them falls prey to the 
ignorance and error problems. These problems suggest that we endorse a 
theory of concepts which is at least partially externalistic. Fodor’s theory 
of concepts is of this kind, but I argued that it cannot do since it doesn’t do 
any explanatory work in its own right, but rather has to rely on the notion 
of a sustaining mechanism. As an alternative, I proposed a dual theory of 
concepts, where (at least) natural kind concepts have distinct cores and 
identification  procedures.  The  cores  are  externalistic  essence  beliefs, 
which determine  reference as  a  function  of  what  actually  triggers  the 
concept’s identification procedure.
Noticing  that  concepts  determine  reference  brings  purely  a  priori 
accounts  of  reference  into  question.  Philosophers  typically  study  our 
semantic  intuitions,  which are mere effects of the real  determinants of 
reference, that is, concepts. I argued that each of the existing accounts of 
reference  are  inadequate.  The  description  theory  falls  prey  to  the 
ignorance and error problems, and conflicts with findings in experimental 
psychology. The causal theory, on the other hand, is undermined by the 
qua-  and  composition  problems.  Finally,  neither  account  explains  why 
certain terms refer externalistically. I argued that refining the theories of 
reference leads to an account practically identical to the dual theory I am 
defending.
The  dual  theory  has  some  important  advantages  over  the  other 
theories of concepts and reference. The core determines reference and is 
the  ultimate  arbiter  of  categorisation;  it  enables  concept  sharing  and 
stability,  and  may  also  warrant  analytic  inferences.  The  identification 
procedure,  on  the  other  hand,  determines  fallible  categorisation 
judgements and warrants inductive inferences. Finally, I argued that the 
fact that natural kind concepts have externalistic essentialist cores may 
explain  a  phenomenon  about  natural  kind  term  reference  that  has 
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troubled  philosophers  since  Kripke,  namely  the  problem  of  rigid 
predicates.
6. SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLES
Article  I  examines  the  relationship  between  philosophical  theories  of 
reference  and  empirical  psychology  of  concepts  from  a  general 
perspective, focusing on natural kind terms. I argue that both description 
and causal  theories  of  reference involve,  or  need to  introduce,  certain 
psychological elements. Refining the causal and description theories with 
the help of psychology of concepts ultimately leads to the dissolution of 
boundaries between the two kinds of theories. However, it is argued that 
even the resulting refined account of  reference is incomplete in that it 
does not account for what makes natural kind terms rigid. In this article, 
by  ‘rigidity’  I  mean  the  phenomenon  that,  in  every  possible  world,  a 
natural kind term applies solely to instances of the same natural kind that 
it actually applies to, even if no one knows the deep structure of the kind. 
Thus,  explaining  what  makes  natural  kind  terms  rigid  basically  comes 
down  to  explaining  what  makes  them  refer  externalistically.  In  the 
conclusion of this article, I put forward the following sketch of a unified 
account of natural kind term reference:
(T) A natural kind term t applies to an object x iff the DCt maps x in 
the extension of  t  as  a  function  of  what  actually  triggers  in  the 
relevant speakers the RCt (p. 168).
In (T),  DCt refers to what in Article I is titled the ‘deep component’ of a 
natural  kind  term  t,  and  RCt refers  to  what  is  titled  its  ‘recognitional 
component’. In the article, I leave it open for future research what the two 
components of  natural  kind terms specifically are.  Now I  can conclude 
that  the  deep  component  of  a  natural  kind  term  is  the  externalistic 
essence belief of the concept associated with the term. The recognitional 
component,  in  turn,  is  the  identification  procedure  of  the  concept 
associated  with  the  term,  and  it  typically  consists  of  prototypes  or 
exemplars (and possibly also more theoretical beliefs). The externalistic 
essence belief  determines that  a  natural  kind concept applies  solely  to 
samples that share some relevant deep structure with the samples that 
actually trigger the concept’s identification procedure. 
Article II is best interpreted as elaborating  on the nature of the ‘deep 
component’ of a natural kind concept; it is in this article that the notion of 
an  externalistic  essence  belief  is  first  introduced.  I  and  my co-authors 
argue  that,  in  contrast  to  what  psychological  essentialists  maintain, 
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psychological  essentialism  can  be  considered  as  modelling  not  only 
categorisation judgements or property inferences, but also reference. We 
put  forward  two  possible  semantic  adaptations  of  psychological 
essentialism, a hybrid and a strict externalistic account. On the latter account, 
a  natural  kind concept C applies  to  an object  if  and only  if  the  object 
possesses the real, external deep structure of the samples actually called 
C. On the hybrid account, a natural kind concept has two senses, of which 
in one, the  externalistic  sense,  the concept applies to whatever possesses 
the real, external essence of the category, and in the other, epistemic sense, 
to whatever satisfies the identificatory knowledge the speaker associates 
with the term. For instance, if all cats turned out to be robots (Putnam’s 
(1975) example) while they are believed to be mammals, strict externalism 
implies that cats have all the time existed, and that the term ‘cat’ has all 
along referred in virtue of  the robot essence,  whereas the hybrid view 
entails that cats did exist in the externalistic sense, in which ‘cat’ applied 
to robots, but that cats did  not  exist in the epistemic sense, where ‘cat’ 
applied to mammals. The strict externalistic view is motivated by Kripke’s 
and  Putnam’s  externalism,  while  the  hybrid  view  is  motivated  by 
experimental  results  which  suggest  that  natural  kind  terms  may  be 
ambiguous  between  two  senses,  externalistic  and  epistemic  (Braisby, 
Franks, & Hampton 1996).
We  examine  an  experimental  study  that  claims  to  undermine 
externalism about natural kind concepts, due to Nick Braisby et al. (1996). 
We argue that due to some experimental and theoretical flaws, the study 
fails to assess externalism. We then go on to present two experiments of 
our own, the results of which support the strict externalistic reading of 
psychological essentialism. We conclude that natural kind concepts have 
an externalistic essentialist core which determines their reference.
Article III focuses on criticising Fodor’s theory of concepts, according 
to  which  concepts  are  atomistic  mental  representations  that  refer  in 
virtue  of  specific  kind  of  causal  relations  between  properties  and  our 
dispositions to token a concept. Fodor argues that whatever psychological 
or other mechanisms mediate between properties and our dispositions to 
token  a  concept  do  not  semantically  constitute  the  concept,  or  are 
necessary in order to refer with it. Instead, the causal relations alone, no 
matter  how they  are  mediated,  suffice  to  determine reference.  Fodor’s 
account thus  denies  the  traditional  psychological  accounts  of  concepts 
any semantic force: they model merely the sustaining mechanisms, which 
are  not  necessary  for  reference,  but  rather  only  non-semantically 
associated with concepts.
I  argue  that  Fodor  is  wrong  in  claiming  that  the  mechanisms 
sustaining  the  reference  determining  property  –  concept  tokening 
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relations  (or  p/C-relations  for  short)  are  accidental  for  reference.  I 
investigate various specific mechanisms that might actually sustain the p/
C-relations, namely deferential intentions, essence beliefs, prototypes, and 
what Margolis (1998) titles  syndromes. Syndromes are sets of represented 
category typical features; deferential intentions are dispositions to use a 
term  in  accordance  with  some experts;  essence  beliefs  we  are  already 
familiar with. I argue that, of these mechanisms, syndromes, deferential 
intentions,  and  essence  beliefs  are  strictly  necessary  for  the  reference 
determining  p/C-relations  they  sustain.  Moreover,  even  though 
prototypes are not strictly necessary for the p/C-relations they sustain, 
there  are  no  non-trivial  alternatives  to  them.  I  conclude  that  the 
sustaining mechanisms, as they are studied in experimental psychology, 
are not irrelevant for reference, but instead necessary.
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